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This paper examines the labor market effects of unemployment insurance extensions.  It 
uses administrative Social Security matched employer-employee data from Austria.  Critical 
components of the analysis are effects on wages as well as retirement/job separation effects.  
 
The paper found that: 
• Older workers are very responsive to unemployment insurance benefit extensions, which 
in our setting may have served as a bridge into early retirement. 
• These separations stem from high-value employment relationships, and may constitute 
inefficient separations. 
• Wages appear unresponsive to such shifts on workers’ nonemployment outside options, 
implying that these workers may not be able to use such reforms to improve their 
bargaining power – even if they are older and on the retirement margin. 
• However, in a second study, we find no effects on separations of such policies even for 
older workers.  The key difference is that one reform was potential benefit extensions 
(entailing early retirement) rather than the benefit levels (in increases in the generosity of 
which even older workers did not separate from their jobs). 
 
The policy implications of the findings are:  
• Unemployment insurance benefit generosity may interact with retirement policies and 
trigger early retirement among older workers eligible for these benefits. 
• These separations may be socially inefficient and may therefore have welfare costs. 
• Subsidizing early retirement policies does not entail wage pressure. 
1 Introduction
By Coasean theories of jobs, the employer and the worker exploit all bilateral gains from trade and
reach bilaterally efficient outcomes, through flexible bargaining and contracting. Hence all job sep-
arations are mutually preferable and efficient, in that no bargain could have been found, however
complex, to prevent the separation and save the employment relationship. By contrast, frictional
(“non-Coasean”) settings put limits on such contracting, for example in form of wage rigidity or
institutional constraints. In such settings, inefficient separations can emerge. Whichever of these
two perspectives provides a better description of real-world job dynamics naturally determines
the welfare properties of employment adjustment and hence the potential scope for policy inter-
ventions. Yet, an empirical test of the Coasean benchmark is challenging exactly because of the
abstract allocative concepts underlying its strong efficiency properties in the first place: joint job
surplus split by unrestricted transferable-utility compensation arrangements.1
We present an empirical evaluation of whether the Coasean theory of jobs can account for
separation behavior. Since surplus and bargaining cannot be directly observed, we implement a
revealed-preference test. We study a transitory treatment that, while active, reduces job surplus
and thereby causes separations. After the treatment is sharply deactivated, the group of surviving
jobs then lacks a mass of marginal (low-surplus) matches.2 These surviving jobs should exhibit
resilience to any kind of subsequent shocks – compared to a control group never exposed to
the initial treatment, as the sole statistic determining separations is joint job surplus (with wage
bargaining rendering the initial incidence of shocks on the firm or worker side irrelevant).
Our specific treatment reducing job surplus is a nonemployment subsidy, specifically aprogram
implemented in Austria in 1988 that raised the duration of unemployment insurance benefits from
one to four years. Since eligibilitywas determined by age cutoffs (age 50 and up) andwas restricted
to specific regions, we implement a difference-in-differences design comparing age groups and
regions, in the universe of Austrian social security data. The program was suddenly abolished
in 1993, providing us with the opportunity to implement our revealed preference test: after the
program abolition, the group of formerly treated job survivors, whom we track in population-level
administrative panel data, should be more resilient – have fewer separations – in response to any
future shocks, compared to their control peers.
Our first empirical step documents that the program triggered an increase in separations of
10.9ppt (27%) over the five-year horizon the program was active: 51.4% of jobs in the treatment
group separated, compared to a counterfactual separation rate of 40.5% in the absence of the
reform.3
1For example, measured flow wages, even if appearing rigid, can be viewed as consistent with bilaterally efficient
bargaining outcomes (Barro, 1977; Hall, 2005; Shimer, 2004; Hall and Milgrom, 2008), and labels like quit and layoff can
both denote efficient separations (McLaughlin, 1991).
2Our point of departure are theories featuring heterogeneity in match surplus (as in, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides,
1994; Bils, Chang, and Kim, 2012; Mui and Schoefer, 2019), in contrast to simplified models of perfect homogeneity,
either on the worker side (e.g. Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1988), or on the firm (productivity) side as in textbook DMP
models without heterogeneity (Pissarides, 2000).
3Lalive et al. (2015) study the same program with a focus on search externalities from treated onto untreated
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The efficiency benchmark predicts that these program-induced separations should have ex-
tracted low joint surplus jobs. This low surplus property is not directlymeasurable by observables.
To study the attributes of these incremental separators, we extend the complier analysis method
by Imbens and Rubin (1997) and Abadie (2003) to difference-in-differences settings such as ours.
These incremental separators did not carry features that would map clearly into surplus or effi-
ciency properties. They only exhibit somewhat lower worker fixed effects, are more likely to stem
from blue-collar jobs, and from industries with high disability incidence, which are characteristics
perhaps pointing towards lowworker surplus – but, for example, the compliers have similar wages
and many other attributes as the other groups.
In a second step, we implement our revealed-preference strategy. We exploit the abrupt
abolition of the policy in 1993, in our panel data tracking the job survivors (among those jobs
active already at the onset of the program in 1988) in both the treatment and control groups.
By the Coasean benchmark, the abolition should realign the surplus distributions among job
survivors: each surviving control group job has an active, iso-surplus peer in the former treatment
group, except, crucially, for a missing mass of marginal matches, which separated and which we
do not track among the survivors in our panel data. This set of marginal jobs should have surplus
between zero and a cutoff equal to the surplus value of the UI program, and are the first to separate
ahead of any inframarginal program survivors.
Strikingly, in the data, the two groups exhibit identical post-abolition separation behavior –
despite the massive depletion in the ranks of the former treatment group, which is around 18%
smaller than the control group due to the treatment. The lack of resilience in separations holds
unconditionally as well as in response to negative labor demand shocks (sharp establishment
shrinkage events and negative industry growth).
Juxtaposed, the large separations effect and subsequent absence of resilience are hard to rec-
oncile with the Coasean view of jobs. Specifically, we show that the Coasean view can only
rationalize the perfect comovement of separation rates under narrow conditions: if idiosyncratic
job-level surplus exhibits no persistence whatsoever, so that the post-abolition surplus distribution
immediately and perfectly reconverges between the former treatment and control groups, despite
the large extraction of marginal jobs. Yet, such perfect reshuffling may be implausible, as it would
need to occur within the very first year after the program abolition.
To quantify this rationalization formallywithin theCoasean framework, we estimate theweight
the data put on either a full-persistence benchmark or an immediate-and-perfect-reshuffling bench-
mark. We estimate thismodel structurallywithGMM,usingvariation across cohorts, and industry-
occupation cells. Point estimates imply that 100% (lower end of 95% confidence interval: 89.0%) of
unemployed job seekers’ job finding rates; Inderbitzin et al. (2016) study effects on disability insurance entry among the
unemployed, but also assess composition effects from the inflow margin. Winter-Ebmer (2003) studies inflow effects
of the program between two broad groups (all below 50 vs. 50-65) using a 2% sample of our population data. Lalive
et al. (2011) find small inflow effects of different, national reform in Austria. Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) provide empirical
evidence on the interaction of UI and retirement in Finland. Hartung et al. (2018) study the macro consequences of a
German UI reform, including separations. Feldstein (1976) and Doornik et al. (2018) study how UI eligibility affects
temporary layoffs and recalls.
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jobs would need to follow the “full-reshuffling already within one year post-abolition” benchmark
for a Coasean model to rationalize the data.
In this estimation, we exploit the model-implied piece-wise linear relationship between the
treatment group separations and the control group separations after the policy’s abolition. We
assume that the groups are hit by the same aggregate surplus shockswithin cells across the regions.
In the Coasean model, separations follow a single-dimensional “pecking order” of jobs ranked by
joint job surplus. Our first benchmark is given by a model variant with perfect persistence in
idiosyncratic job surplus. Then, for small shocks, separations occur in the control group but not
in the treatment group – up until a “kink” beyond which the former treatment group should start
seeing separations. That kink is positioned at the job that was marginal with respect to the UI
extension in the model, and in the data its position is identified as the control group reaching a
post-abolition separation rate corresponding to the treatment effect from the initial UI extension.
The treatment effect was large, so that kink is far to the right of zero on the x-axis, and hence
this full-persistence benchmark predicts substantial resilience among the program survivors. Our
second benchmark is a variant in which job-level surplus has no persistence whatsoever. Here,
the previous extraction of marginal jobs by the policy is inconsequential for the post-abolition
surplus distribution, which immediately converges across the two groups. As a result, the former
treatment group post-abolition separations move one-to-one with control group separations. That
is, they are predicted to trace out the 45-degree line (as we find in the data), rather than the piece-
wise linear kinked relationship with the resilience (zero-separations) region (as predicted by the
the aforementioned persistence variant).
Our preferred alternative interpretation of the absence of resilience is that the separations
were not Coasean (rather than surplus reshuffling within a short period of time). Yet, while
all efficient separations are alike, each frictional setting is inefficient in its own way, as with
Tolstoy’s unhappy families. A specific non-Coasean candidate that is parsimonious and perhaps
particularly plausible for our sample builds onwage-setting frictions, for example completely fixed
wages on the job.4 Then, exactly by preventing the flexible (re)bargaining underlying the Coasean
result, such frictions complicate the “positive surplus” test from single-dimensional Coasean joint
surplus, to two unilateral surplus concepts: separations may occur because either worker-specific
or firm-specific surplus turns negative. As a result, jobs can inefficiently separate even though one
party’s surplus remains large enough to, in principle, bribe the other party into continuation (if
only the requisite trade were implementable).
In this non-Coasean setting, the original UI extension, which boosted worker’s outside options,
would have destroyedmatches with initially lowworker surplus – but not necessarily with low firm
surplus. After the abolition, the non-Coaseanmodel would therefore predict resilience in response
to worker-surplus shocks – but analogously not necessarily to firm surplus shifts. Consequently,
if firm-surplus shocks account for most post-abolition separation, then the non-Coasean model
4Jäger et al. (2018) document that Austrian wages appear unresponsive to UI benefit level shifts (studying reforms
that did not entail separations). We cannot credibly study wage effects in the present empirical setting given the large
attrition implied by the separation effects.
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can rationalize the empirical perfect comovement of post-abolition separations between former
treatment and control groups – even if idiosyncratic job-level surplus has persistence. In fact,
the non-Coasean model naturally suggests a direct reinterpretation of the previous structural
estimation of the Coasean one. Now, the perfect empirical comovement we document implies that
at least 89% of the post-abolition separations are due to low firm surplus.
This non-Coasean narrative is consistent with, first, the absence of resilience specifically in
response to negative labor demand shocks (sharp establishment shrinkage events and negative
industry growth). Second, for our sample of older workers, the implied type of joint distribution of
highworker surplus and lowfirmsurplus turns out to bepredicted by the long-standinghypothesis
of implicit contract models, in the form of backloading of compensation over the job spell (Lazear,
1979, 1981): in a period-by-period consideration, young (low-tenure) workers are “underpaid”,
while older (high-tenure) workers are “overpaid.”5 In fact, the Austrian institutional setting
features an explicit role for works councils that are consulted in the separation process, providing
formal support for such implicit contracts. Third, the tentative evidence on the characteristics of
the marginal jobs we document in our complier analysis appears somewhat consistent with this
narrative on some dimensions, such as larger separation effects in industries with a higher share
of sick or disability leave.
We also resolve an ostensible tension: whydid the extraction of somany lowworker-surplus jobs
in response to the initial UI program not measurably lower separation rates of the survivors? The
resolution has two simple features. First, high typical worker surplus rationalizeswhy fewworkers
are usually on their unilateral separation margin. Indeed, our sample consists of male, older, and
high-tenured workers. Institutionally, Austria mandates multiple months of severance payments
in the case of layoffs that are potentially foregone when quitting, providing little incentive for
workers to quit unilaterally and pushing up worker surplus. Second, the exceptional generosity
of the UI extension – four years of eligibility, potentially serving as a bridge into early retirement,
and worth around 70% of an annual salary – still strongly affected those typical workers otherwise
inframarginal to normal worker-side shocks.6
Section 2 presents an overview of the Austrian institutional context, the policy, and our data.
In Section 3, we document the large separation effects entailed by the UI extension. We also
conduct a complier analysis to characterize the marginal jobs destroyed by the policy. In Section
4, we study the separation behavior of the treatment and control groups after the program was
abolished. Section 5 assesses the capacity of the Coasean model to rationalize the data, while
Section 6 presents a specific non-Coasean setting that can potentially do so. Section 7 concludes.
5Frimmel et al. (2018) shed light on this hypothesis studying seniority-wage profiles and separations. Employer com-
petition model with downward wage rigidity (Cahuc et al., 2006) generate an increasing wage-experience profile with
high worker surplus and small firm surplus, but these models feature bilaterally efficient bargaining and separations.
6Aprediction of this view is that smaller shifts in outside options should not induceworkers to separate. Indeed, Jäger
et al. (2018), who study wage responses in response to UI benefit changes from different Austrian reforms, document
that such smaller benefit shifts did not entail separation effects even among older workers and even during the 1980s in
Austria.
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2 Institutional Context, the Policy Variation, and Data
We review the UI system, the UI reform, other relevant institutional context as well as our data
below.
2.1 The Austrian UI System and the UI Benefit Extension
The Austrian UI System During the 1980s and 1990s Two crucial institutional features ensure
that UI generosity cleanly shifts the nonemployment outside option ofworkers in our setting. First,
Austrian workers are fully eligible for UI benefits upon quitting, after fulfilling a four-week waiting
period. Second, similar to most other European countries, the Austrian system does not feature
experience rating, as the Austrian UI system is funded through employer and employee payroll
taxes (which were not affected by the reform).
During the 1980s and 1990s, the gross replacement rate was between 40 and 48% for most
employees, and capped below and above at a minimum and maximum amount.7 The potential
benefit duration (PBD) of UI benefits during the 1980s was 30 weeks, provided the worker had
worked (and paid contributions to the UI system) for at least three out of the last five years; oth-
erwise, PBD was 20 weeks. After exhaustion of UI, the unemployed can apply for unemployment
assistance (UA, “Notstandshilfe”). UA benefits are means-tested (on income of other household
members) and granted for successive 39-week periods, but could in principle be extended forever
if eligibility is maintained. UA benefits are capped at 92 percent of UI benefits; in 1990 the median
paid UAwas about 70 percent of the median UI benefit. 59 [26] percent of the unemployed receive
UI [UA].
1988-93 Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) In 1988, the Austrian government enacted
a regional extended benefit program (going forward “REBP”), a large region- and age-specific
expansion of potential benefit duration – originally 30 weeks – to 209weeks for older (50+) workers
in a subset of regions in the country. We calculate the cash value of extended benefits to correspond
to about 71% of a typical worker’s annual salary in Appendix A. Figure 1 Panel (a) presents the
resulting potential benefit duration (PBD) by age group over time.
A job loser had to satisfy each of the following criteria at the beginning of his or her unemploy-
ment spell: (i) age 50 or older; (ii) a continuous work history (780 employment weeks during the
last 25 years prior to the current unemployment spell); (iii) residence in any of the 28 selected labor
market districts for at least 6 months prior to the claim; and (iv) start of a new unemployment spell
after June 1988 or spell in progress in June 1988.8
Therefore, the reform induces variation along multiple dimensions, permitting a difference-in-
differences design: first, across age as we can compare workers aged 50 and above to their younger
7UI benefits are not taxed. The net replacement ratio, UI benefits over the wage net of social security contributions
and income taxes, is around 55%, slightly higher than in the US. See Jäger et al. (2018) for details on replacement rates.
8The location criterion was further tightened by a 1991 reform which added the requirement to also have had
employment in the REBP regions.
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peers; second, across regions: REBP regions to non-REBP regions.9 The difference-in-differences
nature of our research design allows us to control for unobservable confounders at the region and
age/cohort level. We net out region-level shocks (including market-level effects of the reform) by
comparing slightly younger and older workers in the same region who were narrowly affected or
unaffected by the reform. We also net out age- or cohort-specific factors by comparing the same
cohorts across regions.
Figure 1 Panel (a) also plots an economy-wide UI reform in August 1989, again based on age
and experience.10 That national 1989 reform raises PBD for workers aged 40 to 49 [50 and above] to
39 [52] weeks with an experience requirement of 312 [468] weeks of employment in the last 10 [15]
years. This 1989 reform is orthogonal to the regional variation we analyze: as it applied uniformly
across all regions, it is netted out through our cross-regional differences. More precisely, then, for
job losers fromAugust 1989 onward, REBP’s incremental effect on duration was by 3 years (as then
the baseline PBD was 52 weeks), and it was 3.44 years (= 209 weeks – 30 weeks) before August
1989.
The policy aimed to mitigate labor market consequences of a crisis in the iron-, steel- and other
heavy industries (“steel sector” in the following). The state-owned company, the Oesterreichische
Industrie AG (OeIAG), had suffered from low commodity prices, shrinking markets, and low
productivity since the mid-1970s. In response, the new OeIAG management implemented a
sequence of restructuring plans during the 1980s, leading to plant closures and downsizing. The
REBP regions were selected due to their large share of employment in the steel sector: in the REBP
regions, about 17% of workers were employed in the steel sector, compared to around 5% in the
non-REBP-regions. Figure 1 Panel (b) provides a map of the REBP labor market districts.
Importantly, REBP did not impose any industry requirement for a job loser’s eligibility: all
unemployedwhomet criteria (i) to (iv)were eligible. TominimizeUI policy endogeneity problems,
our empirical analysis below excludes workers employed in the steel sector. We address any
further concerns that remaining workers may be subject to spillovers from the steel sector decline
or otherwise to differential regional shocks or trends by capturing – and netting out – such effects
with our second difference of young ineligible cohorts in the REBP and non-REBP regions.
Abolition of the Program REBPwas initially in effect until December 1991 before it was extended
in January 1992.11 REBP was then abolished (stopped accepting new entrants) on August 1, 1993,
though claimants e.g. in ongoing spells who established eligibility to REBP before August 1993
9In principle, we could leverage additional variation over time and using an experience cutoff for the reform. In
Section 3.1, we describe why we focus on region and cohorts as our main source of variation.
10The reform also increased the replacement rate from 41 to 47% in the monthly income bracket from 5,000 to 10,000
ATS, roughly 400 to 800 USD at the time.
11The 1992 extension enacted two changes for new spells. First, the benefit extensionwas abolished in 6 of the original
28 regions. We exclude from our analysis the set of treated regions that were excluded after the 1991-reform. Second,
the 1992-extension tightened eligibility criteria for extended benefits: new beneficiaries had to be not only residents,
but also previously employed in a treated region.
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continued to be covered.12 The abolition decision was formally announced in June 1993, an
implementation gap of only two months. The program end occurred in an abrupt fashion: in
fact, in January 1993 the Austrian government had come up with a plan to expand access to longer
benefit duration to older unemployed workers in allAustrian regions from one to four years along
with changes in the eligibility requirements.13 In the followingweeks andmonths, the government
reversed course completely and abolished REBP.
2.2 Other Institutional Details
Interaction of UI with Other Social Policies Interacting with other welfare programs, REBP
could effectively serve as a bridge into permanent nonemployment. In the absence of the REBP,
unemployed men could effectively retire early at age 58 by claiming unemployment benefits for
one year and special income support for another year before drawing a regular public pension
at age 60 (the retirement age for male workers with at least 35 years of social security insurance
contributions).14 Since the REBP extended the maximum duration of UI benefits by three years,
eligible workers could already permanently withdraw from the labor force at age 55.
Another important program was disability insurance (DI). During the study period, the Aus-
trian system granted relaxed access to a DI pension from age 55 onward, allowing job losers in
REBP regions to retire already as young as age 51 while being on some kind of benefit up until age
60, when they could then start claiming their public pension.15
Advance Notice for Layoffs, Works Councils, and Severance Pay While employment protection
is not as stringent as in many other countries, an Austrian firm laying off a worker has to obey a
set of rules. At the time of the REBP, the firm had to give advance notice, which amounted to 5 [4,
3, 2, 1.5] months for workers with at least 25 [15, 5, 2, 0] years of tenure. Workers, too, are obliged
to give a (one-month) advance notice.
12In addition, the 1993 abolition featured a grandfathering clause (§81) that granted longer benefits for those employ-
ment relationships that had already been announced to be terminated before the implementation of the reform, but for
which the advance notice period would lead to a formal end of the relationship after the abolition date. We describe
the advance notice periods below. Empirically, we analyze post-REBP resilience starting in 1994q1 to take account of
the grandfathering clauses.
13We confirm this course of events in a newspaper content analysis. For instance, Der Standard (a major Austrian
newspaper) reported in an article entitled “Länger Geld für alle Altersarbeitslosen (Longer benefits for all unemployed
workers)” from January 9, 1993: “All older unemployed workers throughout Austria - and not only in [REBP regions]
as in the past - will be eligible for unemployment benefits of four years instead of one. Minister of Social Affairs, Josef
Hesoun, and the social partners have agreed in principle on this [...].” [translation by the authors].
14For men, our sample, special income support is a program available for unemployed workers during the last year
before they can claim the regular public pension. For workers with long contribution histories, the statutory retirement
age was 60 (unemployed women aged 59) during the study period. Special income support was therefore available at
age 59. Special income support is equivalent to UI spell in legal terms, but with 25 percent higher benefits, paid for a
period of at most 12 months.
15DI applicants below age 55 get a DI pension when a health impairment reduces the work capacity by more than 50
percent in any occupation. In contrast, DI applicants above age 55 are considered as disabled if their work capacity is
lower than 50 percent in the same occupation. In practice, this means that not only health but also employability criteria
establish DI access after age 55.
7
The Austrian labor law provides a role for works councils in the layoff process. In firms with 5
ormore employees, workers can organize inworks councils. The firmhas to inform and consult the
works council when a layoff is planned and, if the firms fails to do so, the layoff becomes void. If a
layoffviolates substantial interests of theworker, the firmhas to prove that the layoff is economically
necessary for the survival of the firm. The works council must also be consulted when choosing
the particular worker to be separated. The works council also ensures that potential hardships of
layoffs candidates are taken into account, which provides some employment protection for older
and longer-tenuredworkers. Mass layoffs in larger firms are subject to specific further rules. Firms
with more than 100 employees that reduce employment by more than 5 percent (or more than 50
employees) within one month must give written notice to the regional employment agency, one
month before the mass layoff is implemented, where failure to notify renders the mass layoff void.
In case of a layoff, the firm has to make a severance payment to the worker in our study period.
The amount is a step function of worker tenure: 3 (5, 10, 15, 20, 25) years of tenure map into 2 (3,
4, 6, 9, 12) monthly salaries, and zero below three years. Severance payments are only due for the
following separation types: layoffs (but not dismissals for cause), job terminations upon mutual
agreement (between firm and worker), and after the end of a temporary contract. In contrast,
worker-induced quits are exempt from the severance-pay rule, except for workers with more than
10 years of tenure.
2.3 Data and Sample
The Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) is a matched employer-employee data set covering
the universe of private-sector and non-tenured public sector employees in Austria from 1972
onward (Zweimüller et al., 2009).16
We drop all individuals working in the steel sector because the reform targeted these workers
who presumably face worse labor market prospects. Likewise, we drop the 6 regions that were
covered by the REBP only until 1991. We also drop women for data and institutional reasons.17
The vast majority of our sample fulfilled the experience requirement; since this sample restriction
turned out to not affect our estimates, we present the unconditional results. We report summary
statistics for our main analyses in Table 1. We primarily focus on workers born after 1933 as older
cohorts had already exited the REBP program at the time of its abolition due to regular retirement.
We include cohorts up to workers born in 1948, so that our age-based control cohorts are those
born between 1943 and 1948, who were younger than 50 at the time the program was abolished in
1993.
16We complement the ASSD with data from the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs on employment histories before
1972, to determine whether or not a worker is eligible for REBP (which is based on work experience within the last 25
years).
17First, whereas old age insurance rules allowmen to retire at age 60, women can retire at age 55. Second, individuals
must have been employed in 15 out of the last 25 years in order to be eligible for REBP. Since we cannot observe all 25
years prior to the reform, it is likely that classification errors arise for women, who have a less continuous work history
than men in our data.
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3 Large Separation Effects from the REBP Unemployment Insurance
Benefit Extension
In Section 3.1, we estimate that the differential benefit extension (from 52 to 209 weeks) increased
job separations among eligible workers by 10.9ppt (27%) among initial matches over the five year
program horizon, in the treated cohorts compared to their ineligible peers. Most of these excess
separations went into long-term nonemployment perhaps followed by early retirement, rather
than to employment with other firms. We present visual evidence of raw data before turning to
regression estimates, to assess the parallel trends assumptions underlying our research design. In
Section 3.2, we additionally characterize the incremental REBP separators in a complier analysis,
showing that it would be difficult to assess the efficiency properties of these separations on the
basis of observables, motivating our subsequent revealed-preference strategy on the basis of post-
abolition separation behavior of job survivors in Section 4.
3.1 Separation Effects
Plotting RawData: Cohort Gradients of Separations We sort the population of 1988 job holders
(the onset of the reform) by month-of-birth cohorts and into REBP and non-REBP regions, and
then plot outcomes over the course of REBP in Figures 2 and 3. Each figure presents levels for each
cohort by region, and the within-cohort, between-region difference.
Younger cohorts born after 1943 turned 50 after the REBP was abolished in 1993 and therefore
could never claim extended benefits under the program. Older cohorts born before 1933, while
eligible for extended benefits, were older than 55 at the time the REBP was initiated in 1988 and,
at that age, also had access to more generous disability/early retirement benefits with relaxed
entry conditions, as described in Section 2. For completeness, we plot these cohorts in the figure
but do not include them in subsequent regression samples. Moreover, they had reached the male
retirement age of 60 before the program’s abolition in 1993, thus these older cohorts separated
by 1993 even in the control region. The intermediate cohorts, born between 1933 and 1943, were
exposed to the reform in REBP regions. Exposure to extended benefits was maximal for the cohort
born in 1938, who turned 50 at the onset of the reform in 1988 and was then exposed to the reform
until it was abolished in 1993, when the 1938 cohort turned 55.
In Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2, we plot raw data of the fraction of workers in a cohort-
region group that separates from their 1988 employer (defined as a worker-establishment match)
by 1993q3, the first quarter after the REBP had been abolished. We assign workers by the location
of their 1988q2 establishment and leave out workers in the 6 regions eligible for the REBP only
through 1991 (TR1 regions in Figure 1 Panel (b)). The red dashed and blue solid lines of Figure
2 Panel (a) show the share of workers in respectively the REBP and control regions who had
separated from their 1988 employer by 1993; Panel (b) shows the difference between the share of
separators in the REBP and in the control regions. Throughout, there is a clear cohort gradient in
the control regions, indicating that older workers’ 1988-93 separation share is higher than younger
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workers’ share starting with the 1943 cohort and older (who are 50 in 1993), but flat for younger
cohorts (born after 1943).
We start our analysis of REBP on separations from the right, with the ineligible young control
cohorts born after 1943. These exhibit a separation rate of roughly 40 percent in both regions, and
differences between REBP and control regions are flat (in fact close to zero). These parallel trends
among younger cohorts validate the identification assumptions of our difference-in-differences
design by suggesting that labor market conditions were comparable for the separation margin
across REBP and control regions during the study period.18
For affected cohorts born between 1933 and 1943, separations are markedly higher in REBP
regions (but not in the non-REBP regions), representing the treatment effect of REBP. At its peak,
the difference in the share is about 20 percentage points relative to a control region share of about
50 percent. By comparing slightly older and younger cohorts within the same region, we net out
any differences between regions that are constant across cohorts (including market-level effects of
the program).
We conclude with the oldest cohorts on the left. A treatment effect emerges even in this cohort:
the gradient in the REBP region reveals a higher separation rate than in the non-REBP region.
However, note that these cohorts born before 1933 had mostly retired by the end of the REBP, and
therefore hardly any workers in these birth cohorts were still employed with their 1988 employer
by 1993 in either region.
Potential remaining confounders are shocks or unobservables in separation behavior that vary
at the region-by-age level. For instance, pathways to retirement could differ between regions as
a consequence of different industry structures. To address this concern, we switch to separation
during a fixed agewindow, 50 to 55, rather than between time periods (years 1988 to 1993).19 Panels
(c) (levels) and (d) (differences) in Figure 2 show that separations between the ages of 50 and 55
increased markedly in cohorts exposed to the REBP relative to older and younger non-exposed
cohorts, again compared to the gradients in the control region. The job separation probability
increases steadily from around 40 percent in older cohorts to about 50 percent in younger cohorts
in the control region (blue solid line, Figure 2 Panel (c)). While the pattern for the pre-1933
and post-1943 cohorts is similar in the REBP regions (red dashed line) with slightly lower shares
throughout, separations rise sharply for the treated, intermediate cohorts born between 1933 and
1943. As Figure 2 Panel (d) shows, the magnitude of the increase at peak is almost 20 percentage
points.
Finally, Figure 3 plots quarters nonemployed (Panels (a) and (b)) and unemployed (benefit
receipt) (Panels (c) and (d)) between 1988q2 and 1993q3, mirroring Figure 2. For the non-exposed
younger cohorts, trends are flat and the levels between the regions are essentially the same.
For the cohorts exposed to the reform, Figure 3 reveals an economically significant increase of
18We also include a figure studying a longer horizon of younger cohorts where trends remain completely flat and
close to zero (see Appendix Figure A.3).
19In practice, we select the job in the quarter before the 50th birthday (right before aging into REBP eligibility), and
the separation outcome in quarter before turning 55 (as the disability and early retirement incentives changed at 55).
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nonemployment and a similar increase in unemployment (unemployment insurance/assistance
spells) of about three and two quarters at peak, respectively.20 We find similar results when we
consider the sample of employedworkers at age 50 and track these non-/unemployment outcomes
through age 55 (see Appendix Figure A.4).
Regression Estimates of Treatment Effect We complement the graphical evidence with regres-
sion estimates on the average treatment effect in Table 2, in a difference-in-differences specification
on the population of workers holding a job in 1988 before the onset of the reform, for various
outcomes Drci described below, for worker i in region r in birth cohort c:
Drci  β + REBP Regionr + Treated Cohortc + ν · REBP Regionr × Treated Cohortc︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
Zrc
+χrci . (1)
The coefficient of interest ν captures the effect of REBP eligibility Zrc , defined by birth cohort
and location. We set Zrc  1 for workers located in the REBP region who were born before
August 1943, so that they were older than 50 at some point during the active period of the REBP
(and zero otherwise, for our control groups).21 Here and in subsequent regression analyses, we
exclude workers born before August 1933 from our sample because an overwhelming majority
had retired by August 1993 anyway. The model includes a baseline REBP region effect and a
baseline effect for being a member of a treated cohort. Our regression specification thus exploits
within-region, within-cohort variation.22 In the main specifications, we cluster standard errors at
the level of administrative regions (groups of districts, Arbeitsamtsbezirke) but have also assessed
robustness for clustering at other levels. Our main table reports on the cohort-based design (1998-
93 outcomes) in Table 2; we additionally report the age-based estimates (50-55) in Table A.3, finding
similar results. We keep the young control cohorts to a five-year range to isolate the workers most
comparable to the older, treated cohorts in the labor market. As in the raw data plots, we ignore
workers in the few municipalities where the REBP was abolished early.
Table 2 column (1) shows our main result regarding the separations effect of the outside option
increase: a 10.9ppt increase in separations by 1993q3 among initially employed workers from their
20For the more continuous employment measures we also find treatment effects among older cohorts since they were
affected by the REBP before reaching retirement age (even though they are overwhelmingly retired by 1993).
21That is, we do not condition on the REBP experience requirement (more than 15 years of experience in the last
25 years before unemployment entry). We do so because the correct point in time to measure eligibility is hard to
define and reaching the experience requirement during REBP is potentially affected by the policy itself (and workers not
meeting the requirement in 1988 may meet it later on). This differs from the design in Lalive et al. (2015), who focus on
unemployed workers for whom the experience requirement is well-defined at unemployment entry. More than 90% of
workers older than 50 in our sample fulfill the experience requirement. Accordingly, unreported checks confirmed that
the exclusion of workers ineligible due to the experience requirement would not substantially affect our results (neither
the treatment effects estimated here, nor the post-REBP predictions and resilience effects studied later). Regarding the
location in the REBP region, we draw on the location of workers’ establishment and, if that is missing, the residence
based on data from AMS, the Austrian employment agency.
22Since the project varied over time, we could additionally use variation in the time dimension, e.g., in a triple-
diff specification with a placebo reform in 1978. Due to the long program duration (five years), we shy away from
additionally using variation over time for identification since wewould have to rely on long lags to implement a placebo
reform analysis (including the post-REBP analyses) that would not be contaminated by the REBP.
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1988q2 employer. This represents about a 27% increase in separations, relative to a counterfactual
separation rate of 40.5% in the absence of REBP (regression constant plus the baseline effects for
treatment region and old cohorts). The 95% confidence interval for the separation effect ranges
from 2.9 to 18.9ppt.
We then split the effects on separations into the two possible types: separations either into
nonemployment (i.e. those without employment at another employer between 1988 and 1993)
and the complement (i.e. separations of individuals who had employment at another employer at
some point between 1988 and 1993). REBP-induced separations are entirely made up of the former
(separations into nonemployment). In column (2), we report a sizable increase in nonemployment
separations of 12.0ppt (SE 4.3ppt). Column (3) of Table 2 reports effects on quarters nonemployed
between 1988 and 1993, finding a positive effect of 1.46 quarters (SE 0.38). Column (4) reports that
quarters unemployed (defined as unemployment insurance/assistance receipt) increased by 0.95
quarters (SE 0.53). Column (5) shows that a large share of the increase in nonemployment can be
accounted for by a reduction of 1.05 quarters in continuous employment with the initial employer
(SE 0.37), such that our setting does not represent the standard temporary layoffs mechanism
(Feldstein, 1976).
Taken together, the evidence shows that REBP benefit extensions caused job separations (10.9ppt
or 27% increase), shorter employment with the initial employer, and a tantamount increase in
unemployment.23 This effect comes in response to a treatment of 209 weeks of potential benefit
duration compared to 52 weeks in the older control group, i.e. a differential four-fold increase in
potential duration of UI benefits by three years.24
3.2 Complier Characterization of REBP Separators
We next dissect the characteristics of the incremental REBP separators – marginal jobs. They
are compliers: they would have survived in the absence of the treatment (hence still present in
the control group) but did not survive when exposed to it (treatment group). To study their
attributes, we extend the complier analysis method (Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Abadie, 2003) to
difference-in-difference settings such as ours. We compare the marginal matches separating due
to REBP (“compliers”) to those matches that separate even in the control group i.e. absent REBP
(“always-separators”) and the matches that survive even in the treatment group i.e. despite REBP
(“never-separators”). All characteristics we consider are measured before the start of REBP in 1988
and thus are unaffected by the reform by construction.
We will conclude that studying the attributes of these REBP separators is neither exactly nor
definitely informative about their efficiencyproperties, becauseworker, firmand joint job surpluses
23Wealso replicate the separation effects based on survey data from theAustrianMicroCensus. The survey also allows
us to measure ostensible types of separations, e.g., quits, based on a retrospective classification by survey respondents
(see Appendix Section B).
24Both groups had at most 30 weeks PBD in 1988, but a national reform in 1989 increased that level to 52 weeks,
leading us to choose this benchmark given the program duration through 1993.
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are not directly observed – the key motivation for our study to focus on a revealed-preference test
of the Coasean framework based on the introduction and then abolition of a surplus-relevant
nonemployment subsidy program, which we continue in Section 4.
3.2.1 Methodology: Complier Analysis in Difference-in-Differences Settings
In Appendix C.1, we provide a detailed, stand-alone methodological guide and proof to extend
complier analysis (Abadie, 2003) to difference-in-differences contexts, building on an additive
separability assumption for attributes. We provide intuition and then a summary of the formal
methodology below.
Intuition of Complier Analysis For the ease of illustration, suppose that policy Z is randomly
allocated and leads to additional separations of, by definition, marginal matches M. We would
like to distill information about the attributes carried by these marginal jobs M (for example the
mean x̄ of some scalar variable x, but the methodology can be applied to identify any moment of
the distribution). Empirically, we observe the attributes as well as the share of treatment-group
separators and control-group separators. On their own, treatment and control separators stem
from largely inframarginal surplus ranges, of surplus at least or at most 0. Yet, we can back out
the attributes of marginal matches (those with close to 0 surplus and hence swept up by REBP) by
rearranging the expression for treatment separators, which are the union of control separators and









⇔ x̄M  δ
1
δ1 − δ0 × x̄
Z1 − δ
0
δ1 − δ0 × x̄
Z0. (3)
Theweights aremeasured as group-level separation rates, alongwith treatment effect δ1−δ0. Below
we extend complier analysis to difference-in-differences settings such as ours; to our knowledge,
the formal derivation is new.
Setup We set up a potential outcomes framework for the difference-in-differences model (1)
estimating the effect of REBP on separations among workers holding a job already pre-REBP in
1988, with fixed effects for region r and cohort c. D ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a given worker
separates from their initial, pre-reform job by the end of the reformperiod (whether shewas treated
or not). Z ∈ {0, 1} captures whether workers are REBP-eligible (1) or not (0). D0 and D1 denote the
potential values of D for Z  0 and Z  1 (D  ZD1+ (1−Z)D0). REBP varied by region r ∈ {r0 , r1}
and cohort c ∈ {c0 , c1}. r0 is the control region and r1 is the REBP region. c0 (c1) denotes ineligible
(eligible) cohorts. We thus have that Z  1 for (r1 , c1) only, and Z  0 for other combinations
(r1 , c0), (r0 , c0) and (r0 , c1). Always-Separators have potential outcomes (D0  1,D1  1) and share
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πAS. Never-Separators have potential outcomes (D0  0,D1  0) and share πNS. Compliers –marginal
jobs – have potential outcomes (D0  0,D1  1), i.e. they separate when affected by the policy but
would otherwise not separate, and share πC. Figure 4 Panel (a) illustrates the empirical shares of
these three groups from identified by our difference-in-difference design.
Identification and Estimation of Complier Means We show how complier characteristics in
difference-in-differences designs are identifiedunder familiar first stage, independence, andmono-
tonicity assumptions as well as a new additive separability assumption for characteristics x. The
latter is analogous to assumptions of parallel trends or additive separability in recent work extend-
ing the instrumental variables setup to difference-in-differences settings (De Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille, 2018; Hudson et al., 2017).
Under the four assumptions above,we canexpress the characteristics of compliers,E[x |r1 , c1 ,D1 
1,D0  0], in terms of estimable quantities:










E[x |r1 , c1 ,D0  1]. (4)
Under the independence and additive separability assumption, the quantities on the right-hand
side can all be measured in the sample so that complier characteristics are identified in DiD IV
settings such as ours (see Appendix C).
In Appendix C.1, we also present a one-step regression estimation of complier attributes in
difference-in-differences settings. For inference, we use the non-parametric bootstrap to arrive at
a sampling distribution of (4).
3.2.2 Results
Figure 4 and Appendix Table A.2 provide an overview of means for compliers, never-separators,
and always-separators, based on pre-reform data from 1988, along with p-values for mean dif-
ferences between compliers and the other groups.25 As before, we focus on cohorts born after
1933. Figure 4 Panel (b) plots differences between compliers and never-separators, normalized by
the standard deviation for each variable. In Figure 4 Panel (c) (and the last column of Appendix
Table A.2), we also present estimates of treatment effect heterogeneity of REBP on separations by
estimating (1), interacting treatment with covariate indicators (we split continuous variables at the
median), largely mirroring the results of the complier analysis.26
25We provide a test of an implication of the additive separability assumption and report results in Appendix Table
A.1. While we find statistically significant differences for some variables we consider, the magnitudes of the respective
differences are small.
26Specifically, the density of nearly marginal matches carrying x, backed out from treatment and control separators,




Z0. Alternatively, s(x) is the product of the relative treatment effect on




· f (x). See also results in Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Angrist and Fernandez-Val
(2013) for Bernoulli-distributed covariates.
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Webriefly summarize the results here. At a broad level, observable characteristics of separators
provide some (though limited and mixed) evidence consistent with low and declining surplus.
Another limitation is that each given attribute may carry multiple potential interpretations. Fi-
nally and most importantly, and a priori, observable complier attributes are merely potentially
surplus-relevant, in that they are mere correlates of those underlying surplus-relevant factors in
V. Appendix C.3 provides a full discussion of the results.
We find that, compared to jobs surviving the treatment, compliers are primarily blue-collar
workers in declining establishments from manual labor-intensive industries with higher shares
of disability or sickness among older workers. Compared to surviving jobs, marginal jobs had a
higher risk of long nonemployment duration and were more prevalent in shrinking industries and
firms.
But the analysis also reveals that the REBP separators stemmed from many pockets of the
Austrian labormarket andwould thereforenot bedefinitely identifiedbasedon their pre-separation
attributes. For example, we remarkably find no evidence for wage differences between compliers
and never-separators – perhaps consistent with wage compression or wage rigidity.
This difficulty to trace surplus concepts on the basis of observables motivates our revealed-
preference test, to which we devote the rest of the paper, tracking jobs after the surprise abolition
of REBP in 1993.
4 Puzzle to theCoaseanBenchmark: NoAttenuatedSeparationsAmong
REBP Survivors After its Surprise Abolition in 1993
Wenow exploit the surprise abolition of the reform inAugust 1993 (described in Section 2) to study
whether REBP “survivors” – jobs that existed before the onset of the reform in 1988 and continued
through its abolition in 1993 – subsequently exhibited lower separation rates unconditionally
and in response to negative labor demand shifts. That is, we essentially test for a dynamic
known as “harvesting effects” in demography (see, e.g., Schwartz, 2000; Basu, 2009), usually
applied to transitory negative health shocks (e.g., heat waves) that induce deaths among low-
health individuals and reduce the subsequent average mortality rate of the survivors.
Wefind that, after the abolition of the reform, the “survivors” in the dramatically shrunk former
treatment group exhibited exactly the same separation behavior as the control group – on average,
and in response to industry and firm labor demand shifts. Together, the large quantity of REBP-
induced separations before 1993, and the zero differential post-REBP behavior, are inconsistent
with the core prediction of resilience from our preferred Coasean benchmark, for which we lay out
intuitions in Section 4.1 and in formal detail in Section 5. We will dedicate the rest of the paper to
understanding this result.
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4.1 Informal Discussion of Coasean Prediction: Resilience from Missing Mass of
Marginal Matches
To motivate our study of post-abolition separation outcomes, we now summarize the intuitions
underlying the predictions from the Coasean framework, whichwe fully present in a formal model
as well as in a structural estimation in Section 5.
The Coasean benchmark assumes that efficient bargaining reallocates surplus between the
worker and the firm so that any job with positive joint surplus will be viable, and a match will
be destroyed when joint surplus turns negative. This framework implies an ordered set of jobs
that separate in response to a surplus-relevant shock exceeding the initial surplus level: small
shocks destroy jobs with small joint surplus, larger shocks will additionally sweep up jobs with
larger joint surplus. Hence, REBP – which reduced surplus by boosting worker’s nonemployment
outside option – ought to have extracted jobs with surplus below the REBP surplus shift, and
thereby changed the composition of surviving employment relationships towards jobs with higher
initial surplus, or gross-of-REBP surplus. Crucially, we exploit the abolition of REBP, which reduces
again the outside options, aligns surplus between treatment and control groups, and restores the
allocative surplus distribution of the surviving jobs to the right. By then focusing on job survivors
(active at the onset of REBP and through its abolition date) in the panel, the former treatment
group then features a missing mass of marginal matches destroyed by REBP, which are still active
in the control group. A testable prediction of the Coasean view of jobs is that right after the
REBP abolition, the formerly treated group of REBP survivors should be more resilient in their
separation rate compared to the control group, where these marginal, low-surplus jobs are still
present. As time progresses after the abolition, reshuffling of idiosyncratic surplus may weaken
this prediction by somewhat “filling” the hole again, as we discuss in the formal model.
Figure 5 illustrates this logic. Panel (a) represents a hypothetical distribution of joint job surplus
right before REBP takes place. During REBP, all jobs with negative joint surplus (i.e. all jobs in the
left-most, light blue area) separate both in the control and in the treated regions. In the treated
regions, there is an extra set of jobs (the polka-dotted region) that separate only because exposed
to REBP but would survive active absent REBP. We estimated this treatment effect of REBP on
separations as a 10.9ppt (about 27%) increase from a separation rate of 40.5ppt in the absence of
the program (Table 2, column (1)).
These marginal matches will be missing in the treatment group once the reform is abolished.
This missing mass is illustrated in Panels (b) and (c), which plot the distribution of surviving jobs
by the end of REBP, in the treated and in the control regions respectively. Thismissingmass is large
in the data: by the end of REBP, the eligible older cohorts in the REBP region has shed 10.9ppt of
workers from their ranks. Among older cohorts in the control group, who had a 40.5% separation
rate, these marginal, low-surplus jobs still comprise 0.1091.0−0.405  18% of active jobs.
The crucial feature of our two-step research design becomes clear when contrasted to an
alternative naive design studying differential separation behavior during REBP, without the sharp
program abolition. In such a design, the treatment group is indeed subject to a stricter cutoff,
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but only in terms of gross-of-REBP surplus. Yet, net surplus is allocative during REBP. The
separation rates as well as responsiveness depend only on the local density of surplus around the
two thresholds, which could be larger or smaller following REBP and would simply inherit the
properties of the surplus distribution, which is not measured.27 So, on their own, these outcomes
during REBP are uninformative about the efficiency properties of these initial separations.
Given the tension between data and Coasean predictions, in Section 6wewill discuss how non-
Coasean settings – which do not feature a one-dimensional ordering of jobs by joint surplus – can
rationalize our findings. For example, suppose that wages were rigid or layoff/firing restrictions
were active, so that REBP selected workers into separation based solely on worker surplus (as it
boosted workers’ outside options) rather than joint job surplus. Then, resilience would emerge to
worker surplus shifts, but not necessarily to firm surplus shifts.
4.2 Baseline Results
We now present our study of the post-REBP separation behavior as a revealed-preference test of
the prediction of the baseline Coasean model, that the extraction of marginal jobs leads to more
resilience in the former treatment group, which lacks marginal matches, compared to the former
group control group, where the marginal matches are still present.
Plotting Raw Data: Post-REBP Separation Rate Gradients by Cohort In Figures 6 (levels) and
7 (differences between regions) we plot the post-REBP separation cohort gradient among “REBP
survivors” in the former treatment and control groups: among the jobs already active right before
the onset of REBP in 1988 that continued through its abolition in 1993. In practice, we allow
for REBP spillovers due to layoff notices and explicit grandfathering that the law permitted for
pre-scheduled layoffs (see Section 2) so we focus on jobs that survived through the first quarter
of 1994 for the post-REBP analysis.28 Hence, our cutoff defining the survivor sample is 1994q1.
Except for this sample restriction, the figures mirror the cohort gradients of separations in Figures
2 and 3. We explore the fraction of REBP survivors subsequently separating at various horizons.
Figures 6 and 7 reveal that, comparing a given treated cohort and its peer control cohort, there
are no post-REBP separation differences whatsoever among surviving jobs previously exposed to
the REBP compared to those those that were not. The raw data on separation-cohort gradients
provide nonparametric evidence for the absence of resilience.
As aquantitativebenchmark, bothfiguresplot the predicted separation rate basedon theCoasean
model, which we formally derive and discuss in Section 5. Intuitively, the Coasean model derived
in Section 5 predicts smaller separation effects in the formerly treated group post-abolition as initial
27The specific statistical property guiding separations in response to small shocks would locally be the reverse hazard
rate, discussed in detail for extensive margin employment adjustment more generally in Mui and Schoefer (2019) with
a focus on spot-market labor supply.
28This grandfathering likely played a role in the additional increased separation rate in the REBP region immediately
after the program’s abolition. Appendix Figure A.5 documents these additional separations by separating the within-
cohort regional difference from 1993q3 to 1994q1 into quintiles of industry growth over the same time period. In Section
6.4, we clarify that a version of the non-Coasean model can rationalize these patterns even without grandfathering.
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treatment effects of REBP on separations in a given cohort become larger (depicted in Figure 2 Panel
(b)). This is because these cohorts feature a larger mass of margin matches at the point of REBP
abolition, and separations in these formerly treated cohorts pick up only once the counterfactual –
proxied for by the peer cohort in the control region – exceeds the initial treatment effect. For now,
we note that the gap between the prediction and the Coasean benchmark is quantitatively large,
confirming that our test has power.
Regression Evidence To gauge quantitative effects and to assess confidence intervals, we again
estimate the difference-in-differences model in Equation (1) on the current sample (REBP stayers)
and the post-REBP separation outcomes. We choose 1994–1996 as one example but report the full
set of horizons inAppendix TablesA.4 throughA.6. Specifically, we track the labormarket status of
“REBP survivors” from 1994q1 through 1996q1, following the same birth cohorts and regions but
with the additional “survival” restriction of being observed in the same establishment in 1988q2
and 1994q1. Just as in the previous section, we ignore those working in the regions where REBP
was abolished by the end of 1991. We estimate, for a series of outcomes, the model:




among the sample of survivors in both groups for both regions. Again, we focus on a sample
of workers born after 1933 and include younger control cohorts born from 1943 to 1948 never
eligible for the REBP. As before, we cluster standard errors at the administrative region level. The
coefficient of interest remains ν, the difference-in-differences between REBP-eligible and -ineligible
cohorts and regions.
We report results in Table 3. This basic difference-in-differences analysis of post-abolition
separation behavior shows that the REBP survivors were not more resilient in the post-abolition
phase. If anything, we find point estimates indicating small, positive effects – the opposite of
resilience. In column (1), studying separations by 1996 as outcome, we report an estimate of
ν of 0.6ppt (SE 0.9). The tight confidence intervals allow us to rule out effects smaller than
−1.2ppt.29 We find similar effects on the separation-into-nonemployment margin in column (2). In
columns (3) through (5), we consider more continuous measures of time in nonemployment, time
on unemployment benefits or assistance, and continuous employment with the original employer.
Across all margins, we detect no resilience and the point estimates are small with tight confidence
intervals.
29At longer horizons, we find small positive effects and can statistically rule out any negative effects (see Appendix
Tables A.4 through A.6). We also report an alternative version of Table 3 where we drop workers close to the retirement
age (see Appendix Table A.7). In that sample we again find small positive and statistically significant separation effects,
i.e. the opposite of more resilience.
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4.3 Labor Demand Shocks
We present additional results below to illustrate the robustness of the absence of differential post-
REBP separation behavior. This is a subset of the long series of unreported robustness checks
in search for resilience we have conducted.30 Here, we test whether proxies for negative labor
demand shocks may unmask the potentially underlying missing mass of marginal matches that, by
the Coasean view, should render the formerly treated group less sensitive to shocks. Both at the
industry and at the establishment level, we find that separation behaviors of the groups remain
indistinguishable.
Heterogeneity by Industry Growth Since we study the separation margin, the Coasean bench-
mark would predict resilience to negative shocks in particular. We therefore plot the differential
separation rates among jobs that survived REBP separately for the top, middle and bottom tercile
of the industry growth distribution from 1994 onward (to the reference year in which we define
separations after REBP) in Figure 8. Even in declining industries (the 1st tercile has negative
employment growth), in which joint surplus is arguably shrinking, REBP cohorts do not exhibit
relative resilience compared to the control group.
Establishment-Level “Hockey Sticks” We construct proxies for separation-inducing establish-
ment labor demand shocks by tracing out “hockey stick” graphs (Davis et al., 2013): separation
rates are steeply negative in the negative net employment growth region (largely driven by lay-
offs), then feature a kink around zero employment growth and are somewhat positive (due to
turnover associated with hiring). Exploiting the matched employer-employee dimension of our
population data, we replicate these graphs in Figure 9 Panel (a), where we plot annual separation
rates for all male employees employed in Q1, by bins of annual net employment growth (where
both employment and separations are hence defined beyond our worker sample).
Figure 9 Panel (b) plots cohort-region-specific the separation rates through 1996 (we include other
end points 1995, 1997, 1998 in Appendix Figure A.6), among the sample of jobs that survived the
REBP period through 1994q1. For this analysis, we focus on cohorts from 1936 through 1948 to
avoid retiring cohorts (in Appendix Figure A.6, we focus on cohorts born after 1935, 1937, and
1938, respectively). The results are naturally noisier due to the shrinking sample, but are still
informative because the Coasean view would predict that separations occur by a pecking order
following the ranking of job surplus within an establishment. We estimate linear slopes separately
for shrinking and growing establishments and for four separate groups: by birth cohort eligibility
(July 1936 to July 1943 vs. August 1943 to July 1948) and regional eligibility.
The slopes for the old ineligible, non-REBP-region workers and the formerly treated and for-
merly eligible (old REBP-region) workers lie almost on top of each other. This similar separation
behavior provides additional evidence that the massive extraction of potentially marginal jobs due
30In fact, the original motivation of this paper was to establish such resilience, and our firm prior was to find such
resilience.
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to REBP does not seem to affect subsequent layoffs (or separators) at firms.
Lastly, we report cohort-specific slopes, estimating for each birth-year cohort c and region r





n̂e(i),1994+t × 1(n̂e(i),1994+t < 0) × 1c(i),r(i)
)
+ βc ,r2 · (n̂e(i),1994+t × 1c(i),r(i))
+ βc ,r3 · (1(n̂e(i),1994+t < 0) × 1c ,r) + β
c ,r
4 · 1c(i),r(i) + ξi ,
(6)
where Di ,1994+t is an indicator of whether a worker i employed in 1994q1 is still employed with the
same establishment e in Q1 of year 1994 + t. Our worker sample is again the 1988-94 job stayers.
n̂e(i),1994+t is the growth in total establishment employment between 1994q1 andQ1 of year 1994+ t,
in the establishment e where individual i is employed in 1994. 1c ,r is an indicator for being in
cohort c and region r. The coefficient of interest is βc ,r1 + β
c ,r
2 , the sensitivity of separations to
downsizing at the establishment level by year of birth c and region r.
Figure 9 Panel (c) plots the estimates from this regression for separations/growth rates from
1994 to 1996 (i.e. t  2), with similar results for other years (reported in Appendix Figure A.6).
In both the REBP and the non-REBP region, the 1988-94 job stayers (REBP survivors) exhibit a
downward-sloping sensitivity gradient in birth date, indicating that olderworkers appear shielded
fromagiven establishment shrinkage event, perhaps due to seniority rules (see Section 2), larger job
values for human capital reasons (Oi, 1962), or lower outside options among these older workers.
Yet, the lines lie on top of each other: REBP and non-REBP birth cohorts exhibit the same sensitivity
of separations to negative establishment labor demand shifts. (If anything fact, the REBP cohort
appears slightly more exposed to firm shocks.)
5 Can the Coasean Model Rationalize the Absence of Resilience?
We now clarify under which conditions the Coasean view of jobs can rationalize our findings of
no resilience post-abolition. Section 5.1 sets up the general model; Sections 5.2 and 5.3 view the
empirical design through the lens of that model. We start by formally showing that in the Coasean
setting, the formerly-treated group should be less sensitive to any subsequent negative shocks, as
long as there is some persistence in job-level idiosyncratic surplus after the abolition, say from 1994
to 1995. We then show that only under narrow conditions can the Coasean setting explain the
absence of resilience: namely we would require no persistence whatsoever, such that from 1994
to 1995, the first year after the abolition, the surplus distribution of the formerly treated group
would need to converge immediately and fully to that of the control group. In Section 5.4, we
structurally estimate which weight the economy puts on two extremes concerning the evolution of
idiosyncratic job surplus: perfect persistence vs. full reshuffling of surplus. We find that in order to
account for our empirical results, the point estimates reveal that essentially 100% (lower confidence
interval: 89%) of labor market cells of our sample must feature no persistence whatsoever in job-
level surplus. Section 5.5 discusses the model features as well as the interpretation of this horse
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race. In Section 6, we then lay out how a non-Coasean setting can rationalize our results of no
resilience, even with persistence in idiosyncratic, job-level surplus.
5.1 Coasean Bargaining and Efficient Job Separations
The following framework formalizeshow improvements inworker outsideoptionaffect separations
and truncate the distribution of job surplus among the surviving jobs, generating a missing mass
of marginal matches, thereby predicting resilience after the abolition of REBP.
Jobs and Surplus Generally, jobs carry worker surplus SW and firm surplus SF, each of which
must be non-negative: each party i ∈ {W, F}’s inside job value V iIn (amenities, productivity,...)
plus/minus wage w (with which the parties can transfer utility in terms of e.g. present values),
must amount to at least her (separation) outside value V iOut (unemployment, retirement, working
for another firm, the value of a vacancy and hiring another worker,...):
SW (w ,VW )  VWIn + w − V
W
Out ≥ 0, (7)
SF(w ,VF)  VFIn − w − V
F
Out ≥ 0, (8)
where V  {V ia}i∈{W,F};a∈{In,Out}, and sometimes Vi  {V ia}a∈{In,Out}. Additionally, we define joint
job surplus, which the wage splits between the worker and firm:
S(V) 








Figure 10 Panel (a) plots the two-dimensional job space. The x-axis denotes worker surplus, and
the y-axis denotes firm surplus. The figure plots various case studies of jobs characterized by
different surplus coordinates. The solid circles (•) denote gross-of-wage surpluses, i.e. VWIn −V
W
Out for
the worker and VFIn − V
F
Out for the firm. This is the surplus combination these job “fundamentals”
would trigger before wage setting, or equivalently in the scenario of a zero wage. The empty circles
(◦) denote net of wage surpluses: for each gross job, we provide various examples of potential wages.
Wages move net surpluses of the parties along the 135-degree i.e. iso-joint-surplus line.
The figure also partitions jobs into four regions of viability: feasible jobs (north east, solid
line), quits (north west, dashed line), layoffs (south east, dotted line) and mutual separations
(south west, dot-dash-patterned line). For a job to be viable, it must be in the north east corner,
providing positive surplus to both parties. Three natures of separations are represented by the
three remaining corners. Quits emerge if the worker is in negative surplus territory, while the firm
would prefer to continue. This case would emerge in job A, which is “born” in such a potential
quit case. Yet, thanks to redistribution in form of a positive wage, the job can be moved into the
viable quadrant, A1. The wage can also “overshoot”: job A2 has too high a wage, playing the
job firmly into positive territory from the worker’s perspective, but pushing it into negative firm
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surplus territory, leading to a layoff, along with all jobs in the south east quadrant. By contrast,
job B is born in the feasible region even with a zero wage, as one would imagine with, e.g., an
internship or a high-amenity job, for which workers would work for free. Yet the figure plots two
ways to have wages entail separations: B1 has too positive a wage, leading to a layoff. B2 has a too
negative a wage, entailing a quit. Job C goes one step further, where a no-wage scenario would
have the firm prefer a layoff, but too low (negative) a wage would entail a quit (C1), whereas any
positive wage would leave the job in layoff territory (C2). By contrast, doomed jobs such as X are
born in negative surplus territory for both parties, and so provide negative joint surplus such that
no wage can be found to fulfill both participation constraints. Wages in the south west quadrant
hence entail amutual separation (otherwise a quit or layoff). Finally, M is a “marginal” job, carrying
exactly zero joint surplus. That job is born in, e.g., quit territory, but can be rendered feasible with
a unique wage that moves that job into the origin, where both parties enjoy exactly zero unilateral
surplus. Any increase [decrease] from that wage will entail a layoff [quit].
Coasean Bargaining The essence of the Coasean setup is that the parties find a wage within the
bargaining set of reservation wages w ∈ [wW , wF], where SW (wW ,VW )  0 and SF(wF ,VF)  0,
any of which implements the bilaterally efficient allocation: forming and maintaining matches
that carry non-negative joint – rather than private – job surplus (i.e. whenever wF ≥ wW ).31 As a
result, the two-dimensional surpluses that determine job viability, Equations (7) and (8), collapse
to a one-dimensional, single allocative concept of joint surplus (9) defining job viability and hence
separations (defined next in Equation (10)), which the parties split to leave both participation
constraints fulfilled.
In Figure 10 Panel (a), Coasean i.e. efficient bargaining, by flexibly moving jobs along the
iso-joint-surplus curve, renders feasible all jobs born north east of the marginal-jobs frontier (i.e.
those with positive joint surplus).
Separations With Coasean bargaining, we observe a separation if the joint surplus moves into
negative territory. Suppose job values evolve following a Markov process k(V′ |V), where, going
forward, x′ denotes the next-period value of x. Then, for a job of value vector V the probability of





1(S(V′) < 0)k(V′ |V)dV′. (10)
Below, we formally explain why our evidence from the empirical REBP and its abolition is difficult
31For example, byNash bargaining, the worker (firm) receives their outside option [or reservationwage], plus fraction














⇒ wN  [VWOut − V
W
In ] + β · S  w
W
+ β · [wF − wW ].
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to reconcile with the Coasean view, unless one is willing to make extreme assumptions on the
evolution of idiosyncratic job surplus after REBP captured by the Markov process.
The UI Extension (REBP) We think of the treatment, an increase in UI generosity (a binary
variable Z ∈ {0, 1} such that bZ  b0 + Z × ∆b, with Z  1 for the treatment group and Z  0
for the control group), as primarily improving the worker’s outside option VWOut(b), such that the
worker surplus size of the shock is εWb
′  VWOut(b0 + ∆b) − V
W
Out(b0) > 0, where our convention
is that a positive εWb
′ denotes a negative shock to worker surplus (arising from an increase in the
worker outside option), and more generally we will use positive εi to denote negative surplus
shocks going forward – which we assume to be a homogeneous level shifter.32 In our Austrian
context, described in Section 2, even worker-sided quits receive full benefits (after a brief waiting
period). There is no experience rating. UI take-up is high. Alternatively, due to moral hazard
and efficiency-wage mechanisms, the worker’s improved outside option may lower productivity
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986; Katz, 1986) and thus the firm’s inside value,
VFIn(b). Or, surplus may fall if implicit layoff/firing costs fall whenworkers stand to lose less from a
separation, in effect increasing VFOut(b).33 Still, these alternative mechanisms ultimately arise from
the worker’s outside option. In Appendix A, we calculate the cash value of the reform as 71% of a
worker’s annual salary.
Equilibrium Effects of REBP on JobValues b may also enter the firm’s separation value through
shifts in recruitment costs or quality of replacement hires. However, our empirical difference-in-
differences would net out such mechanisms with the second control group (i.e. we additionally
compare slightly younger, ineligible control workers across the REBP and non-REBP regions),
such that the treatment is the differential exposure of the treatment group to the program. These
within-region ineligible slightly younger control workers are presumably close substitutes to and
in the same labor market as their slightly older peers. We therefore suppress such market-level or
spillover effects of the REBP shift on control groups or the treatment groups’ inside values in our
model notation. We discuss this argument in detail in Section 5.5 below.
5.2 Effects of REBP in the Coasean Setting: Intuitions from Contour Maps
We now read our full set of empirical findings during REBP and following its abolition through
the Coasean lens, starting with intuitions from contour maps, then returning to our formal model
in Section 5.3.
To study the group-level effects of REBP, we now switch gears from individual job case studies
to the distribution of heterogeneous jobs. Figure 11 depicts, as our expositional example, the
32With heterogeneous treatment effects, marginal jobs also comprise workers with particularly large valuation of
REBP, a possibility we discuss and address empirically and conceptually in Section 5.5, where we conclude that this
possibility is unlikely to revise our main results.
33For example, since firmsmay backload compensation due to agency concerns, firms’ flow surplus and the continua-
tion value from older workers is negative gross of layoff/firing costs, generated, e.g., by the erosion of the firm’s reputation
to honor such implicit contracts (Lazear, 1979, 1981; Hall and Lazear, 1984; Bewley, 2002).
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contour maps of the joint distribution of worker and firm surplus embedded in the four quadrants
of Figure 10 Panel (a) and illustrates the evolution of jobs: the treatment effect of REBP, which jobs
it destroys, and the consequences for post-REBP job dynamics. The upper panels plot the Coasean
i.e. efficient bargaining cases. (The lower panels plot the analogous non-Coasean (fixed-wage)
case, which we will discuss in Section 6.) The figures plot contour maps of the density of the joint
distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis) surpluses; darker shades indicate higher densities,
at the example of a bivariate normal distribution.
We start with the Coasean setting in Panels (a.C), (b.C), and (c.C). Panel (a.C) depicts how
REBP lowers joint surplus by εWb
′  VWOut(b + ∆b) − V
W
Out(b) > 0. That is, REBP shifts all potential
jobs to the west, along worker surplus, by εWb
′ and thereby extracts – pushes into separation
– all matches with “gross-of-εWb
′” surplus below εWb
′. These jobs drive the treatment effect on
separations documented in Section 3.
After REBP is abolished, depicted in Figure 11 Panels (b.C) (treatment group) and (c.C) (control
group), each surviving formerly treated match’s surplus is restored again to its peer in the control
group, except that the abolition does not bring back to life the previously destroyed jobs, since we
track survivors only. As a result, the former treatment group features a missing mass of marginal
matches with respect to the REBP surplus shock. This gap is indicated by a parallel gap between
the survivingmatches and the zero-joint-surplus line. By contrast, these low-surplus jobs continue
to be present in the former control group, depicted in Panel (c.C).
The testable prediction characterizing the Coasean view is that the former treated group should
exhibit attenuated sensitivities to any post-REBP surplus shocks compared to the control group.
Figure 11 Panels (b.C) and (c.C) illustrate this feature in form of shifts in the worker component
of surplus to the west, which moves the job down the ranking of iso-joint-surplus lines. But as
long as the subsequent shock is smaller than the REBP shocks, it will not entail any separations.
Importantly, in the Coasean setting, the same resilience would emerge with an equally sized firm
surplus – i.e. southward – decline. Therefore due to efficient (re)bargaining and hence joint
surplus serving as the allocative concept, the missing mass of low-joint-surplus matches emerging
from REBP henceworth attenuates the formerly treated REBP survivors’ separations in response
to surplus shocks of either kind. Just as in Coasean bargaining initial endowments are irrelevant
to achieving efficient outcomes, in the job setting the initial incidence of shocks (between workers
and firms) is irrelevant. Such “fungibility” of the incidence of surplus shifts is broken in the
non-Coasean setting in Section 6, and foreshadowed in the lower panels of Figure 11.
Note that in Figure 11 Panels (b.C) and (c.C) we are implicitly considering the case immediately
following the abolition of REBP, when idiosyncratic shocks have not yet reshuffled the surplus
distribution (although during REBP such shocks have hit), generating a clean missing mass of
marginal matches. We discuss and relax this assumption in the formal model below, by permitting
such idiosyncratic shocks.
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5.3 Formal Model of the Research Design
The full model below formalizes the effect of REBP and its abolition within the general Coasean
model of jobs.
During-REBP Separation Behavior Separations (during [after] REBP denoted by δ [∆]) occur if
joint surplus were to turn negative, either due to aggregate shocks denoted by ε (e.g., εWb
′ from
the shift in UI benefits) or idiosyncratic shocks (health, productivity, amenities,...). Denote by
k(V′ |V) the Markov process governing the transition of job values into REBP and by K(V′′ |V′) the
Markovian transition out of REBP, into the post-REBP period. We define S̃(V′) as the short-hand
for the surplus level gross of a given aggregate surplus shifter, such that, for an aggregate shock
−ε′ < 0, S̃(V′, ε′  0)  S(V′, ε′) − ε′. For REBP, ε′  εWb
′, and hence separations in the treatment






1(S̃(V′) < Z × εWb
′)k(V′ |V)dV′︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
≡ d̃(V,Z×εWb ′)
f Z(V)dV. (11)
where d̃ is a slight modification of d defined in Equation (10) to a gross-surplus concept with
separate aggregate shocks, and f Z(.) denotes the distribution prevailing at the onset of REBP,
where we will assume that initial distributions are the same across groups f 0(.)  f 1(.). In
Appendix Table A.1, we empirically support this condition for observable characteristics. By
contrast, f Zpost(.) will denote post-REBP distributions that will naturally diverge due to REBP, not
only in terms of surplus, but also in terms of some direct observables as captured by the complier
analysis in Section 3.2.
In this framework, the treatment effect estimated in Section 3 corresponds to:





1(0 ≤ S̃(V′) < εWb















where the last line clarifies that the difference in separation rates comes from different thresholds
(the gross-of-REBP surplus in the treated regions needs tomeet a higher bar) and not fromdifferent
pre-REBP distributions between the treated and the control regions (which instead we assume to
be the same). The marginal jobs extracted by REBP make up set M′  {V′ : 0 ≤ S̃(V′) < εWb
′}.
These jobs correspond to those indicated by the red polka-dot pattern in Figure 5 (and the cut-outs
in contour maps in Figure 11 (upper panels)). Figure 5 Panel (a) visualizes these surplus ranges,
plotting the hypothetical distribution of gross-of-REBP surplus S̃(V′) at the onset of REBP. Our
model makes no assumption on the origin of this distribution through surplus evolution k(V′ |V).
The surplus distribution is partitioned into: (i) jobs that separate even in the control group –
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fraction δ0 of the total mass at the onset of REBP (light-blue solid pattern); (ii) marginal jobs that
separate due to REBP – fraction δ1 − δ0 (red polka-dot pattern); and (iii) infra-marginal jobs that
don’t separate even with REBP – fraction 1 − δ1 (green dashed pattern).
REBP-Induced Truncation of the Surplus Distribution After the abolition of REBP, the program
has truncated the treatment group’s joint-surplus distribution below εWb
′. Hence, while the wider
set of surviving jobs in the control group is J′  {V′ : S̃(V′) ≥ 0}, in the treatment group, the entire
mass of survivors is concentrated in the inframarginal jobs, V′ ∈ (J′ \M′). 34
In schematic Figure 5, Panels (b) and (c) plot the corresponding surplus distributions right at
the end of REBP –when K(V′′ |V′) has not yet kicked in. Panel (b) plots the treatment group, where
all end-of-REBP survivors are inframarginal jobs (1− δ1 of the original mass). In the control group,
Panel (c) shows that among the survivors (1 − δ0 of pre-REBP jobs), fraction δ1−δ01−δ0  18.3% are
marginal, and 1−δ11−δ0  81.7% are inframarginal.
Post-Abolition Separation Behavior We denote post-abolition-of-REBP functions with capital
letters, namely ∆ for δ, D for d, and K for k. Post-REBP aggregate shocks and job value factors
are denoted by ′′ rather than ′. The post-REBP separation behavior of the formerly treated and
control groups can be formalized by considering aggregate (common to both groups) worker and
firm surplus shocks εW ′′ and εF′′, which we combine into a joint-surplus shock ε′′  εW ′′ + εF′′.
Post-REBP, these shocks lead to the following separation rates in the treatment [control] group






1(S̃(V′′) < ε′′)K(V′′ |V′)dV′′︸                                     ︷︷                                     ︸
≡ D̃(V’,ε′′)
f Zpost(V′)dV′. (14)
Post-REBP, differences in separation rates will arise from differences in f Zpost, the densities of job
qualities between the treatment and the control groups, due to the selective separations induced
by REBP (rather than from differences in aggregate shocks and thresholds εW ′′ and εF′′, which
in turn we here assume to the same across the groups, hence unlike during REBP, which shifted
thresholds Z × εWb
′):





f 1post(V′) − f 0post(V′)
]
dV′. (15)
34The density f 1post(V
′) is zero for the marginal jobs, while the inframarginal REBP survivors reflect the (conditional)

















We now derive the separation rate of the former treatment group by replacing its densities as
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The intuition is straightforward: modulo re-scaling by 1−δ01−δ1 (since, post-REBP, the fraction of
original jobs that remain in the treatment and in the control group is different), the separation
behavior of the treatment group (∆1) is the same as that of the control group (∆0) except for the
contribution of marginal matches (V′ ∈ M′) to the separation behavior of the control group, which
the expression nets out.
In order to map Equation (17) into an empirically tangible object, we now put some structure
on K(V′′ |V′).
Post-Abolition Idiosyncratic Shocks K(V′′ |V′) Up until now we have not made any assumption
on the processes underlying the evolution of job surplus, k(V′ |V) and K(V′′ |V′) – neither during
REBP, nor for separations after the abolition. Two extreme cases are now presented below: perfect
persistence as well as immediate reshuffling of idiosyncratic surplus. Importantly, in both cases, the
evolution of surplus during the five-year REBP period k(V′ |V) is left fully general. We only specify the
Markov process for right after REBP is abolished in 1993, namely K(V′′ |V′), so that this assumption only
covers a shorter time horizon than the original REBP period.
Case I: Perfect Persistence This case permits fully general pre-abolition evolution k(V′ |V). But
it assumes that right after the abolition of REBP, specifically between the abolition period and the
next period, the underlying job surplus is persistent – as the contour maps in Section 5.2 above
assumed. The sensibility of this assumption naturally depends on the given time interval from
the abolition to the time we measure separations in the data; our most conservative horizon is
























one single year following the abolition. Formally, the post-abolition transition matrix is now the




ε′′)K(V′′ |V′)dV′′  1(S̃(V′) < ε′′).
It is useful to distinguish two cases: ε′′ ≤ εWb
′, and ε′′ > εWb
′. In case ε′′ ≤ εWb
′, it








In case ε′′ > εWb
′, all marginal matches separate in the control group and more, and so D̃(V′, ε′′) 




















where δ1−δ01−δ0 is the fraction of marginal jobs in the control group, as discussed above.
Putting the two cases together, for the full range of aggregate shocks ε′′ –which are unobserved
but sufficiently revealed through realized control group post-REBP separation rate ∆0 – we obtain
the model-predicted ∆1 as a function of ∆0, piece-wise linear with slopes and kink positions given
by (δ0 , δ1):
∆1(∆0(ε′′), δ0 , δ1)  max
{









Figure 10 Panel (b) illustrates the relationship between post-REBP treatment group against control
group separations for the persistence version of the Coasean model formalized by Equation (18)
for an example truncation point and surplus distribution, in form of the red dashed line, along
with other variants the paper derives later.
As long as control group post-REBP separation rate ∆0 is lower than the fraction of marginal
matches δ1−δ01−δ0 , no separations should occur in the treatment group, simply because these matches
are missing. Once control group separations cross that threshold, separations commence, and
with a slope steeper than one, 1−δ01−δ1 , because the incremental separator count is over a smaller count
of survivors in the formerly treated group, and both groups will have separation rates of 100% if
all control jobs dissolve. Similarly, if the initial REBP treatment effect was zero, the curve would
trace out a 45 degree line ∆1  ∆0. In that sense, the design has power if the initial treatment effect
during REBP was large – shifting the kink far to the right away from zero on the x-axis.
That is, the revealed-preference treatment/control group approach makes empirically and
36To see this, note that under the assumption of perfect persistence, ∆0 
∫
V′ 1(S̃(V
′) < ε′′) f 0post(V
′)dV′. If ε′′ ≤
εWb
′, all the separations come from V′ such that 1(S̃(V′) < εWb












′, ε′′) f 0post(V′)dV′ .
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quantitatively tractable the Coasean benchmark (with persistence) by reformulating the empir-
ically elusive surplus concepts in form of observables – ∆1, ∆0 and (δ0 , δ1). These properties
sufficiently encode the surplus concepts S as well as shocks εWb
′ of REBP, and the post-abolition
shocks (εW ′′, εF′′).
Complementing the separation-rate-based illustration in Figure 10 Panel (b), we also include a
surplus-based representation driving the separations in Panels (c) and (d), which again as a red
dashed line plots the model-predicted comovement between the post-REBP separation rates of
the treatment and control groups, but now both as a function of post-abolition worker surplus
shifts εW ′′ (Panel (a)) and firm surplus shifts εW ′′ (Panel (b)). In the Coasean setting (but not in
the non-Coasean alternative discussed in Section 6 and also traced out in the figure), the initial
incidence on firms and workers is inconsequential, since only joint surplus, stemming from the
sum of the two shocks ε′′  εW ′′ + εF′′, matters. Therefore, either shock type leaves the formerly
treated group’s separations flat at zero – up until the truncation point of surplus equal to the REBP
surplus threshold εWb
′, from which point on they turn positive with a steeper slope than in the
control group, eventually meeting the control group at 100% for very large surplus shocks. We
have therefore now formally derived of the resilience intuitively described in the contour maps in
Figure 11 (upper panels).
Interim Empirical Evaluation of Coasean Benchmark: Cohort Graphs To gauge the gap be-
tween the data and a benchmark model, we compute and provide the predicted separations fol-
lowing a strictly interpreted Coasean view with perfect persistence in job surplus as presented in
Equation (18). Specifically, for each cohort, we collect the separation rates in the control and REBP
regions to proxy for (δ0c , δ1c) (respectively the blue solid and red dashed lines respectively in Figure
2 Panel (a)), and feed in post-REBP cohort-specific separation rates from the peer cohorts in the
control group ∆0c (blue solid line in Figure 6). The yellow dashed line in Figures 6 (levels) and 7
(differences) plots this predicted Coasean (perfect persistence) benchmark, along with the actually
realized post-REBP separation rates by cohort for the treatment and control groups. We do so for
the first four post-abolition years.
The figures confirm that the design has power. For instance, within the first year (Figure 6(a)),
which covers the first post-abolition year through 1995, the benchmark model would predict zero
separations in the formerly treated group for the majority of formerly treated cohorts, whereas
the control group’s actual post-REBP separation rate hovers around 20%.37 This is because as




i.e. the fraction of marginal jobs in the control group was
even higher than the control group post-REBP separation rate, such that, post-REBP in the control
group, only the marginal jobs are separating – which are not present in the treated group with
persistence in job surplus.
In stark contrast to this Coasean benchmark, the empirical cohort gradient of the post-abolition
separation rate in the formerly treated group follows a pattern that instead nearly perfectly co-
37Separations spike once a birth cohort turns 60 years old, the age of retirement for Austrian men in this period.
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incides with the post-abolition separation rate cohort gradient of the control group. This is true
already at the shortest post-abolition time horizon, from 1994 to 1995, likely captured best by
persistence in job-level surplus. Yet even over longer horizons, multiple years post-separation, the
design retains power but the differences shrink (since ∆0 grows) as Figures 6(b) through (d) clarify.
(On the other hand, at those multi-year horizons such as from 1994 to 1998, the assumption of
persistence in idiosyncratic job-level surplus may serve as a weaker approximation.)
This Coasean benchmark clarifies that the absence of any attenuated separation responses
whatsoever among the treated cohorts documented in Section 4 is quantitatively significant bench-
marked against this prediction, because the effect induced by the REBP on separations was so
dramatic (Section 3 and Figures 2 and 3).
Case II: Perfect Reshuffling Next, we clarify the conditions required for the Coasean framework
to rationalize the observed pattern: ∆1  ∆0. Since we will compare ∆0 and ∆1 across cohorts
(and for an even wider range across an industry-occupation cells in an additional design below in
Section 5.4.3), we look for the condition that is capable of delivering ∆1(ε′′)  ∆0(ε′′) for the entire
range of post-REBP aggregate shocks ε′′ hence captured by any level of ∆0 ∈ [0, 1], and for any
(δ0 , δ1) arising from the REBP determining the missing mass of low-surplus matches in the former
control group. We show that this condition yields a particular assumption about the process
governing idiosyncratic surplus evolution – which then renders inconsequential the extraction of
marginal jobs duringREBP, by reshuffling immediately and fully the surplus distribution, such that
the former treatment and control groups reconverge despite the massive extraction of marginal,
low-surplus jobs. This condition requires that individual jobs do not have any persistence in their
job-level surplus and their ranking, such that even within just a year the “hole” left by REBP in the
treatment group is fully filled again. Formally, the Coasean case requires the following condition
for equality between the separation rates:
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is the density of the inframarginal jobs in the control group.
Thederivation above shows that, to observe the samepost-REBP separation rate in the treatment
and the control group, the average post-REBP separation rate for the jobs in the marginal group
(V′ ∈ M′) must be the same as that for the jobs in the inframarginal group (V′ ∈ (J′ \M′)).
This condition is fulfilled if we have perfect reshuffling of job surpluses one period to the next
(formally, a transition matrix with identical rows).38 That is, perfect reshuffling of idiosyncratic job
surplus can mask Coasean separations: if the economy featured no persistence in worker and firm
surplus whatsoever (such that the idiosyncratic Markov process reshuffles the position of jobs into
the same, stationary surplus distribution in each period), the economy would not actually feature
a truncated distribution when REBP is abolished – despite the massive extraction of temporarily-
marginal jobs from REBP. We will quantify the weight the data put on this extreme interpretation
below in Section 5.4 in a simple structural model, and discuss this assumption and hence more
broadly the capacity of the Coasean model to account for the empirical separation outcomes in
Section 5.5.39
5.4 Structural Estimation of a “Mixed Model”
Neither a full-persistence nor a perfect-reshuffling setting will fully describe empirical labor mar-
kets. To gauge the quantitative power of each extreme view, we present a structural estimation of
a “mixed model” of the Coasean setting that asks which fraction of labor market cells must accord
with the perfect-reshuffling variant to rationalize the observed patterns. We present two strategies:
a simple reduced-form approach and a more formal approach based on a simple structural model.
Both strategies reveal a formal estimate of the visually clear observed pattern that the Austrian
labor market would need to be characterized by no persistence whatsoever in idiosyncratic job
surplus to rationalize a Coasean framework. Confidence intervals bound this share from below at
89%, with point estimates of 100% (or higher).
5.4.1 Mixed Model
Consider a labor market cell i (cohort, or industry-occupation group) present in both REBP and
non-REBP regions. We permit a given cell i to operate according to either the full reshuffling
38Strictly speaking, for a given single surplus shock ε′′ we do not need perfect reshuffling: the condition is that the
average separation probabilities of marginal versus inframarginal jobs are the same. However, for the condition to hold
globally i.e. for all ε′′ surplus shocks and REBP treatment effects δ1 − δ0 – a range we try to trace out with cohort cells
but then also when splitting up the sample into industry-occupation cells with large variation in separation rates in
an additional design below in Section 5.4.3 –, perfect reshuffling (i.e. identical rows in the transition matrix) becomes
necessary.
39Another assumption fulfills the condition at a particular point, but cannot account for the full set of findings: if all
jobs have the same separation probability (say, some large negative (e.g., health) shock that is independent of the current
job surplus), then the condition holds. But while tractable and intriguing, this assumption would be inconsistent with
differential separation in the treated regions in response to REBP (i.e. our treatment effect in the first place) or across
cells post-REBP.
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protocol in a Coasean setting or to the perfect-persistence benchmark. Share κ is of the full-
reshuffling type; share 1 − κ is of the perfect-persistence type.40 We estimate share κ. We do so
by leveraging the structural relationships implied by our economic model of separations for either
model, relating the post-REBP separation rates among cells in the former treatment group Z  1
i.e. ∆1i with the post-REBP separation rates among the peer cells in the control group Z  0, for a
given cell-i-specific set of REBP separation rates (δ0i , δ
1
i ) (whichwe observe), as well as i’s set of (not
directly observed) post-REBP firm and worker shocks resulting in joint surplus shock εi  εWi + ε
F
i
(which however is sufficiently revealed empirically by the post-REBP separation rate in the control
group ∆0i ):















︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
Coasean: Persistence
+νi , (20)
since perfect reshuffling implies∆1i  ∆
0
i while perfect persistence implies that∆
1
i follows the piece-
wise linear curve as predicted from Equation (18). νi captures errors related to, e.g., group-specific
shocks.
5.4.2 Reduced-FormModel with Cohort Variation
Our first strategy estimates model (20) at the birth-year cohort level, comparing post-REBP sepa-
rations by cohort between REBP and non-REBP regions (i.e. we collapse the data to the cohort and
region level). That is, we essentially simply take the data points from cohort separation gradients
plotted in Figures 6 (levels) and 7 (differences) of the predictedCoasean (perfect persistence) bench-
mark, along with the original realized post-REBP separation rates by cohort for the treatment and
control groups. We then let the data select weights on the yellow dashed line (perfect persistence)
versus the blue solid line (perfect reshuffling). For simplicity, we here also approximate model (20)
in this reduced form model while not imposing that the two models have weights adding up to
one. Instead, we here estimate unconstrained coefficients ακ as an estimate for κ and α1−κ as an
estimate for 1 − κ.
Table 4 reports the estimates for various horizons after REBP. For the short run, 1995, the
estimates imply an essential unit weight on the perfect reshuffling scenario as ακ  1.027 and an
(insignificantly) negative weight on the perfect persistence scenario α1−κ  −0.037. In later years,
when likely the power of the resilience prediction decreases, the estimate of weight α1−κ becomes
more negative and even statistically significant. That is, if we were in a Coasean world, we would
fully reject any persistence of job surplus whatsoever, even already in the short run.
40An alternative interpretation of our setup is that we permit a share κ of matches within a cell to be of the full-
reshuffling type and the remainder of the perfect-persistence type.
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5.4.3 Structural Estimation with Industry-by-Occupation Variation
We now present a formal structural estimation of our model to estimate κ, by estimating Equation
(20) with (i) richer variation at the industry-by-occupation level, (ii) accounting for the nonlinear
nature of the specification (due to the max operator in Equation (18)), and (iii) providing a single
estimate and confidence interval for κ in each specification. (Our methodology could be easily
applied to other cell categorizations.) This second estimation again reveals point estimates κ̂ that
are close to or even above 1. Even in our most conservative specification, the lower limit of the 95%
confidence interval for κ is 0.890, indicating that at least 89% of separations had to come from full
reshuffling of job surplus for the data to be consistent with a Coasean setting.
Formally, we estimate κ using non-linear least squares/GMM based on the moment condition
E[νi |∆0i ]  0 in Equation (20). Intuitively, the parameter κ is identified through the non-linearity
in the relationship between ∆1i and ∆
0
i induced by the resilience to non-large shocks to surplus
predicted by the Coasean model with persistence.
To proxy for ∆0i , we use post-REBP separation rates among workers in the non-REBP region in
the same industry-occupation cell who were not treated by the program andwho thus still contain
marginal jobs but that are exposed to plausibly similar industry-level surplus shocks. We use
observed separation rates during REBP in the REBP and non-REBP regions to measure δ1i and δ
0
i
in each industry-occupation cell.
Reduced-Form Evidence on Comovement of Separation Rates Before providing results of the
structural estimation, we plot the reduced-form relationship between ∆1i and ∆
0
i at the industry-
by-occupation level in binned scatter plots in Figure 12. The figure shows the relationship between
post-REBP separation rates (at horizons ranging from 1995 to 1998) at the industry-by-occupation
cell level in formerly treated cohorts (born between 1938 and 1943) in the REBP regions against
separations rates in the same cohorts in non-REBP regions who did not experience the treatment.
The relationship appears strong, positive, and linear. As a placebo benchmark, we also plot as
outcome variable the separation rate in slightly younger, ineligible cohorts (born between 1943 and
1948). The relationship is just as strong and positive, thus providing evidence that the industry-
by-occupation cells in the different regions were affected by similar shocks to surplus. As Figure
12 reveals, there is no discernible difference between the slope of the relationship of separation
behavior of formerly treated cohorts to their same-aged peers in the non-REBP region and the
relationship in slightly younger cohorts. In particular, we do not observe evidence for resilience,
i.e. lower separation rates, at low post-REBP separation rates in the non-REBP regions (which our
structural model will then formally also link with variation in the cell-specific kink position).
Results of Estimation Table 5 reports estimates of κ based on estimation of Equation (20) with
non-linear least squares. Across specifications, we find estimates of κ that are always above 1 in the
non-linear least squares model. The smallest point estimate is 1.027 with variation at the four-digit
level and considering post-abolition separations by 1995. Even the most conservative i.e. lowest
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95% confidence interval for κ̂ rules out κ̂ ≤ 0.89, that fewer than 89% of cells in the Austrian labor
market in our sample would need to be of the perfect-shuffling type to rationalize the data through
the Coasean lens.
The table further reveals even larger estimates at longer horizons, e.g., with the confidence
intervals excluding one when considering separations by 1998, according with intuition that full
reshuffling becomes less implausible atmulti-year horizons. However, even at the shortest horizon,
considering separations by 1995 as outcome variable, we find that 100% (lower 95% confidence
interval: 89%) of the cells would need to be of the perfect reshuffling kind.41
5.5 Discussion of the Coasean Framework
SomePersistence in Idiosyncratic JobSurplus Themodel and its estimation above have clarified
that the Coasean model can only rationalize the evidence under narrow and strong assumptions,
with no persistence whatsoever in job-level surplus, such that the extraction of a large amount of
then-marginal jobs has no consequence for the formerly treated group’s post-REBP job surplus
distribution, which immediately converges to the control group’s distribution. We believe that
this assumption is unlikely to explain our results, although of course this property is difficult to
assess empirically directly. First, such full convergence would be required already at the one-
year horizon. Second, the reform was large such that the idiosyncratic shocks would need to
be accordingly large to replenish the mass of marginal matches: REBP increased separations
by about 27%; and as discussed above, REBP amounted to around 71% of the average worker’s
annual salary. Third, in Section 4, we conduct a complier analysis and in fact trace out some
persistent observable attributes associated with the incremental REBP separators that distinguish
them from their non-separating peers. Fourth, our sample contains older workers with high labor
force attachment, whose baseline turnover is typically lower, perhaps plausibly suggesting that the
amount of separation-relevant idiosyncratic shocks is, if anything, selected towards a stable and
persistent surplus group.
Below in Section 6 we therefore study departures from the Coasean assumption to account for
the observed patterns even in the presence of surplus persistence.
Market-Level and Spillovers Effects Our model appears to require that the abolition restore the
surplus level of each formerly treated inframarginal survivor to the level of the respective control
peer. That is, REBP only affects post-abolition separation behavior through the channel of the shift
in the surplus composition (as marginal matches are now missing). A concern is that REBP could
have affected the surplus distribution through potential separate channels that could offset and
mask the predicted resilience.42
41We have also explored strategies to account for measurement error using methodology for nonlinear models
developed in Li and Vuong (1998), Li (2002) and Schennach (2004), surveyed in Schennach (2012). These lead to
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
42Relatedly, the demography literature distinguishes harvesting effects akin to our Coasean prediction – by which
transitory negative shocks (e.g., heat waves) induce low-health individuals into exit and thereby reduce the subsequent
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Fortunately, due to the two control groups, our empirical double-difference design nets out –
and therefore implicitly permits but resolves – anymarket-level or spillover effects, even those that
have some persistence. It does so specifically for the kinds of confounders that also affect the ineli-
gible slightly younger workers (49 and younger) in the REBP regions, whom our second difference
compares with the same younger birth cohorts in the non-REBP regions. For example, if REBP (or
shocks correlated with REBP) had lowered firm investment, we would expect higher separations
among slightly younger colleagues within the REBP regions (presumably close substitutes and in
the same labormarket). If norms to hire older workers had shifted persistently, wewould expect 49
year old workers along with their 50 year old colleagues to be affected. A similar argument applies
to the fact that REBP aimed to ameliorate the impact of restructuring the steel sector and thereby
targeted perhaps overall slackening labor markets, and lower surplus matches. Plausibly, these
market-wide trends did not discontinuously affect 49 year old workers than 51 year old workers,
and hence are netted out by our difference-in-differences design.
The kind of concern our design does not rule out must therefore discontinuously affect eligible
but not ineligible workers, and persistently so beyond the abolition of the program. Perhaps
younger workers in REBP regions are more likely to retrain, making themmore resilient to shocks
compared to older (eligible) REBPworkers, such that the ostensible absence of resiliencemaymask
resilience among the old compared to if REBP had not happened. However, we would then expect
young cohorts in REBP regions to be more resilient than their peers in the non-REBP regions. As
another example, persistentwage effects of theworkers’ outside option boost could, in combination
with wage rigidity, perhaps lead to subsequently higher separations masking resilience – but such
a route to explain non-resilience already departs from the Coasean view by appealing to allocative
wage rigidity.43 Relatedly, spillovers between eligible and ineligible cohortswithin theREBP region
may dilute the control group. Examples are search or labor demand spillovers (Lalive et al., 2011;
Beaudry et al., 2012), replacement hiring (Mercan and Schoefer (forthcoming)), shifts in marginal
products and wages (Jäger and Heining, 2016) – to the degree that these are persistent beyond
the abolition of the policy (as in the hysteresis effects in Saez et al., 2019). However, these effects
would then still need to show up in the differenced effect between the young across regions. These
differences appear economically small or absent, supporting our design.44
mortality rate of the survivors – from scarring effects – bywhich the original shockmaypermanently lower the survivors’
health going forward thereby working in the other direction in increasing subsequent mortality.
43We cannot credibly study wage effects in the present context given the attrition (separation effects). Yet Jäger et al.
(2018) document that in Austria, wages of stayers are insensitive to UI-induced boosts in workers’ outside option, even
for older workers such as our sample here, and during the 1980s.
44In principle, perhaps exactly the younger cohortsmay in fact be expected to doworse in the REBP regions (even after
dropping the steel sector), and hence their parallel behavior post-REBP with their non-REBP peers may be evidence of
positive spillovers, such that the parallel age gradients may mask differential resilience among the old REBP cohorts.
We expect any such attenuation to be mild given the already nearly perfect alignment between the young during REBP.
Most importantly, the stable parallel behavior across the ineligible cohorts extends to even younger cohorts, as we
confirmed in Appendix Figure A.3, making such differential aggregate trends unlikely to mask resilience among the
eligible cohorts. In any case, such patterns would need to exactly offset the hump shape of the initial treatment effect in
the separation-cohort gradient depicted in Figure 2 (b).
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Heterogeneous Sensitivity to the REBP Treatment Our model assumes homogeneous shifts in
outside options and thus in the level of surplus – as a result of which the REBP marginal jobs are
low-surplus jobs – rather than jobs whose surplus is more sensitive to the REBP treatment e.g.
because valuation of REBPmay be heterogeneous (in that the outside option increases by more for
some workers than others).
One specific potential concern for our interpretation of (or a potential explanation for) the
absence of post-abolition resilience is then that the workers responding to REBP by separating, are
those workers that may have (initially and absent REBP) higher surplus. Then, the introduction
and abolition of REBP would remove high-surplus workers – rather than generating a “hole” of
low-surplus matches around the zero-surplus threshold. In principle, therefore, such a positive
correlation between surplus valuation εWb
′ and gross-of-REBP surplus S̃ could rationalize our
findings even within a Coasean framework and even with persistence in job surplus.
To assess the relevance of this thought experiment, we sort workers into cells that are plausibly
related to heterogeneous valuation of REBP i.e. in εWb
′. Our sorting criterion is a worker’s risk
of having a spell of nonemployment longer than one year.45 This categorization should almost
mechanically sort workers by a factormediating the value of REBP because the program, by raising
benefit duration fromone to four years, shifted outside optionsdepending on theworker’s expected
time in long-term nonemployment spells in excess of one year. To assign workers REBP-relevant
long-term nonemployment risk scores to our sample employed at the onset of the REBP reform
in 1988, we estimate a prediction model regressing realized nonemployment spell outcomes on
pre-separation attributes, in the pre-reform sample of pre-reform period.46
Figure 13 plots three separation gradients as a function of this heterogeneity dimension, which
we bin by quintile and then separately measure outcomes or estimate effects. First, the figure (in
navy hollow squares and connected by the solid navy line) shows that the REBP treatment effect on
separations duringREBPwas indeed substantially stronger amongworkerswith a higher predicted
risk of long-term nonemployment. In the lowest-risk quintile, the separation effects of REBP are
relatively small at around 5 percentage points. The separation effects are markedly larger, at more
than 20 percentage points, in the quintiles with the highest risk of long-term nonemployment.47
Second, Figure 13 plots (in maroon solid circles, dotted line) the level of the separation rate
(during REBP) for the control group. If workers in the highest bin of the valuation of REBP had –
absent REBP being active, as in the control group during REBP – higher surplus, then we would expect
45Other factors may be awareness of the policy, the capacity to quit, myopia, stigma costs from additional time
unemployed.
46For all workers employed in 1982, we regress an indicator for whether they had a nonemployment spell of one
year or longer on a rich set of covariates measured in 1982: industry fixed effects, an indicator for working in a white
collar occupation, the local unemployment rate, and third degree polynomials in tenure and experience. We then take
the estimated coefficients and predict the probability of having a nonemployment spell of one year or longer among
the sample of workers employed in 1988 and create a predicted long-term nonemployment risk score. We then split
workers into quintiles based on their long-term nonemployment risk score and estimate the effect of the REBP reform
within each quintile in a fully interacted difference-in-differences regression taking out the baseline effects of being in
an REBP-eligible cohort and residing in an REBP region both interacted with indicator variables for each risk quintile.
47Nekoei and Weber (2017) construct a related heterogeneity measure, in form of the probability of exhausting the
pre-reform benefit level with a focus on unemployed job seekers’ search behavior, in the context of different reform.
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a steeply declining separation gradient as a function of the valuation variable. We do not detect
such a gradient.48 This result suggests that potential heterogeneity in workers’ valuation of REBP
is not positively associated with initial surplus.
Third, Figure 13 plots (in green hollow triangles and connected by the dashed green line)
the post-REBP separation “treatment effect”, i.e. the difference in the post-REBP separation rates
within each risk cell. This slope is perfectly flat, indicating that evenwithin the high valuation cells,
where the treatment effect was the largest and where therefore high-valuation or low-surplus jobs
were extracted, there is no resilience – an effect that is unlikely to be explained by these jobs having
higher surplus on average (given the mostly flat red-square gradient for the REBP separation rate
in the control regions).
6 Which Non-Coasean Setting Can Rationalize the Findings?
An alternative interpretation of the absence of resilience is that the separations were not Coasean.
For example, frictions such as institutional constraints on selective layoffs or wage rigidity, may
prevent the flexible (re-)bargaining and efficient-only separations underlying the Coasean result.
We now present one plausible non-Coasean alternative that can rationalize the full set of
empirical findings, building on wage rigidity. We again start by presenting the core intuitions
in stylized contour maps. We then move to the corresponding formal model. We again derive
predictions by specifying two cases: one in which post-REBP separations in the former treatment
and control groups track each other – namely if firm surplus shocks drive post-abolition separations
– and one in which we would expect similar piece-wise linear resilience, namely if worker surplus
shocks drive post-abolition separations. The non-Coasean model can hence rationalize the perfect
comovement even with full persistence in idiosyncratic job surplus, if firm surplus shock drive
most separations post-REBP.
6.1 Intuitions from Contour Maps: Effects of REBP in the Non-Coasean Setting
We now provide non-Coasean narrative of REBP and its aftermath in the non-Coasean setting,
plotting contour maps of the density of the joint distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis)
net of wage surpluses in the lower panels of Figure 11. In the non-Coasean setting, wages are
not efficiently (re-)bargained. As a result, the inequality conditions allocative for non-Coasean
separations are the unilateral participation constraints of positive worker surplus and positive firm
surplus i.e. the y-axis and x-axis. This contrasts with the Coasean diagonal line of zero joint
surplus as in the upper panels discussed in Section 5.2.
Figure 11 Panel (a.NC) illustrates that REBP improved worker’s outside option i.e. lowered
worker surplus, hence the treated jobs shift west. After REBP, Figure 11 Panel (a.NC) illustrates
48A priori, one might have even expected a strongly upward-sloping curve, whereas the empirical nearly flat line is
perhaps explained by the sorting on the x-axis being unconditional of a separation, and because for consistency here
we plot the most general notion of a job separation on the y-axis (rather than only those into nonemployment).
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that the former treatment group features a missing mass of low-worker-surplus matches. But the
treatment group may retain a similar share of jobs with low firm surplus as the control group.
Figure 11 Panels (b.NC) and (c.NC) depict the resulting post-REBP behavior in response to firm
and worker shocks, separately for the former treatment group (Panel (b.NC)) and control group
(Panel (c.NC)). The treatment group features resilience to negative post-REBP worker surplus
shifts, but in response to firm surplus shocks, of which both groups may feature a similar share,
separation responses can be accordingly similar.
For the sizable truncation along worker surplus to be quantitatively inconsequential for subse-
quent separation behavior, it must be that also the control group features hardly any separations
to worker shocks post-REBP. This implies that absent REBP, the typical worker surplus must have
been high to begin with (i.e. far to the right as depicted).49 And, REBP must have been large in or-
der to reach deep into the worker surplus distribution to cause (otherwise inframarginal) workers
to separate. In Section 6.4 below we discuss why these features are plausible for our sample and
setting.
6.2 Formal Model of the Research Design
Non-Coasean Bargaining and Inefficient Separations The strong Coasean result of efficient
separations arises from the assumption of flexible (re-)bargaining of compensation, from which
joint job surplus stems as the sole allocative concept. However, a variety of potential real-world
frictions, e.g. wage rigidity, may preclude such wage setting. In our model depicted in Figure
10 Panel (a), such frictions prevent the parties from moving towards a wage in the feasible-jobs
frontier even though the job carries positive joint surplus, thereby shrinking the set of feasible jobs.
Then, the Coasean allocation is not necessarily attainable, and inefficient separations can emerge.
In this non-Coasean setting, we therefore think of wage w as one additional job attribute that can
evolve or be fixed, such that jobs are now characterized by (w ,V), and unilateral worker and firm
surpluses SW (w ,VW ) and SF(w ,VF) are allocative.
In consequence, with non-Coasean bargaining, a separation occurs if at least one of worker







SW (w′,VW ′) < 0︸               ︷︷               ︸
Quit
Mutual Sep.: ∧︷︸︸︷




where separations can be labled as quits (negativeworker surplus but positive firm surplus), layoffs
(reversed), or mutual separations (both negative). The non-Coasean expression also formalizes
that here the initial incidence of a shock matters for separations for lack of automatic Coasean
rebargaining, such that worker and firm values are not “fungible.”
49Alternatively, shocks to worker surplus may be smaller compared to firm shocks.
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Separation Effects from REBP REBP reduced worker surplus, as REBP directly shifted workers’
(nonemployment) outside option. Any market-level effects that in turn affected firm outside
options or inside values we net out with a control group in the data.
Formally, the two separation rates by treatment group (Z  1) and control group (Z  0)
therefore occur to differential worker surplus cutoffs, albeit at the same firm cutoff (here again
normalized to zerowithout loss of generality). Let S̃i(w′,V′) denote the surplus of party i ∈ {W, F}










S̃W (w′,VW ′) < Z × εWb
′ ∨ S̃F(w′,VF′) < 0
)
k((w′,V′)|(w ,V))d(w′,V′)︸                                                                                                      ︷︷                                                                                                      ︸
≡ d̃(w ,V;Z×εWb ′,0)
f Z(w ,V)d(w ,V),
(22)
where d̃ is a slight modification of d defined in Equation (21).
REBP therefore pushed the following mass of jobs initially viable in 1988 into quit or layoff
(or both) territory of negative unilateral surpluses, where again f Z(.) denotes the pre-REBP initial
surplus distribution:







0 ≤ S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εWb
′ ∧ S̃F(w′,VF′) ≥ 0
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′, 0) − d̃(w ,V; 0, 0)
]
f 0(w ,V)d(w ,V).
(23)
That is, the incremental jobs destroyed byREBPhad lowworker surplus, between 0 and εWb
′, making
up the set of marginal-to-REBP jobs M′NC  {(w′,V′) : 0 ≤ S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εWb
′ ∧ S̃F(w′,VF′) ≥ 0}.
By contrast, the firm surplus of these jobs were positive (and moreover need not have been low,
unless the two are very correlated).
REBP-Induced Truncation of the Surplus Distribution As a result of REBP, right after the
abolition, the treatment group therefore features a missing mass of marginal matches between
0 and εWb
′, making up the set of marginal-to-REBP jobs M′NC  {(w′,V′) : 0 ≤ S̃W (w′,VW ′) <
εWb
′ ∧ S̃F(w′,VF′) ≥ 0} with low worker but not necessarily low firm surplus. By contrast, the
distribution of surpluses in the control group remains a larger set J′NC  {(w′,V′) : S̃W (w′,VW ′) ≥
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0 ∧ S̃F(w′,VF′) ≥ 0}, still containing the low worker-surplus jobs M′NC.50
Post-Abolition Separation Behavior We again define the post-REBP separation rate of treatment
[control] group Z  1[ 0] as a function of common worker and firm shocks εW ′′ and εF′′ (which
we can now, in contrast to the Coasean model, no longer collapse into a joint surplus shock ε′′ as








S̃W (w′′,V′′) < εW ′′ ∨ S̃F(w′′,V′′) < εF′′
)
K((w′′,V′′)|(w′,V′))d(w′′,V′′)︸                                                                                                         ︷︷                                                                                                         ︸
≡ D̃(w′,V′;εW ′′,εF′′)
f Zpost(w′,V′)d(w′,V′). (25)









D̃(w′,V′; εW ′′, εF′′) f 0post(w′,V′)d(w′,V′)
]
. (26)
As in the Coasean case, the post-REBP separation behavior of the former treatment group tracks
that of the former control group, except for the contribution of the marginal jobs ((w′,V′) ∈ M′NC)
to such separation behavior. Unlike in the Coasean setting, these missing matches are marginal
with respect to worker surplus – the dimension along which REBP selects them into separation –
but not necessarily with respect to a firm surplus shock.
The Incidence ofWorker vs. FirmSurplus Shifts In fact, this non-Coaseanmodel can rationalize
the observed patterns of separations even if we assume perfect persistence in job surplus following
the REBP abolition (an assumption perhaps particularly plausible within the one-year interval
following the abolition to 1995). By contrast, the Coasean model was not able to explain the
empirical post-REBP separation behavior, except if one were willing to assume full reshuffling in
idiosyncratic surplus.
Figure 10 Panels (c) and (d) plot post-REBP separations in the former treatment and control
groups as a function of post-REBP surplus shocks (for the perfect persistence case). It illustrates
that the initial incidence of a given surplus shock – on the firm or worker side – matters: for worker
shocks, the line representing post-REBP separations in the formerly treated group is flat up until
50Formally in terms of densities, after REBP is abolished, the former treatment group’s post-REBP surplus distribution




0 if (w′,V′) < (J′NC \M′NC) ⇔ S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εWb







if (w′,V′) ∈ (J′NC \M′NC) ⇔ S̃W (w′,VW ′) ≥ εWb
′ ∧ S̃F(w′,VF′) ≥ 0.
(24)
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the point hits the truncation point of surplus, and then increases somewhat more steeply. For firm
shocks however, the separation rates can be very similar between the former treamtent and control
groups in our example, as also depicted in the case study Figure 11 Panels (b.NC) and (c.NC).
This pattern differs from the Coasean setting, where only joint surplus and hence the net sum of
shocks matters, and resilience was unambiguously predicted (provided some persistence). Below
we derive these cases.
As in the Coasean case, our objective is to rewrite expression (26) in an empirically tractable
form of realized control group separation rates (and the original size of the REBP treatment effects).
In order to do this, we first specify the model to feature persistence of idiosyncratic job surplus
(while still permitting any structure on k((w′,V′)|(w ,V)) i.e. no restriction on idiosyncratic shocks
during the five years REBPwas active), such that K((w′′,V′′)|(w′,V′))  1 if (w′′,V′′)  (w′,V′) and






S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εW ′′ ∨ S̃F(w′,VF′) < εF′′
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f Zpost(w′,V′)d(w′,V′). (27)

















As a second and last step to obtaining empirically tractable expressions, we now distinguish two
cases: only worker or only firm shocks driving separations.
Resilience: Post-REBP Separations Driven by Worker Surplus First, suppose most (all) post-
REBP separations arise from worker shocks. In this case, the formerly treated group again exhibits
resilience in form of a piece-wise linear comovement between treatment and control separations
featuring a flat-at-zero region, mirroring the Coasean case. This analogue arises because the
selection during REBP was with respect to the same allocative concept post-REBP. Accordingly,
the resulting expression is analogous to Coasean Equation (18):51
51To see this, consider again the two cases, εW ′′ ≤ εWb
′ and εW ′′ > εWb





(εW ′′) similarly to the Coasean persistence case. For the case of εW ′′ ≤ εWb
′, it holds that jobs for which
S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εW ′′ also have S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εWb
′ and hence these jobs were in the marginal set w.r.t. REBP (w′,V′) ∈
M′NC . Therefore, using Equation (27), we have for the case of εW ′′ ≤ εWb












∆1(∆0(εW ′′), δ0 , δ1)  max
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Figure 10 Panel (b) plots Equation (31), post-REBP treatment group against control group separa-
tions for this case (red dashed line).
Therefore, when there is perfect persistence and only worker shocks, the marginal jobs are
those which separate first and hence the average separation rate of the inframarginal jobs is lower
than that of the marginal jobs, resulting in ∆1(εW ′′) ≤ ∆0(εW ′′) as in Equation (31).
Perfect Comovement: Post-REBP Separations Driven by Firm Surplus We now ask which
properties let the non-Coaseanmodel rationalize the (empirically consistent) comovement between
the groups post-abolition. Of course, making an assumption of perfect reshuffling right after the
abolition could again generate the perfect comovement in the non-Coasean setting (which was
the only way the Coasean setting could rationalize this pattern).52 Yet, additionally even with
persistence in idiosyncratic surplus, the non-Coaseanmodel can rationalize very similar separation
sensitivities between the treatment and control group REBP survivors: if post-REBP separations
are largely due to firm surplus shocks. More precisely and subtly, another ingredient is that worker
and firm surplus are approximately independently distributed, since REBP extracted jobs that
were marginal with respect to worker (rather than firm) surplus.
With firm shocks, again assuming persistence in job surplus right after REBP is abolished
but permitting arbitrary surplus evolution during REBP, the empirical relationship between post-
REBP separation rates in the treatment and in the control group is driven by the relative separation
behavior of marginal and inframarginal matches with respect to firm shocks – which in turn is
determined by the distribution of firm surplus in the marginal vs. inframarginal matches. To
formally derive this result, we start from the general relationship between the separation rates in
which implies that ∆1
εW ′′>εWb
′(εW ′′)  0 by Equation (28). By contrast, for the case of εW ′′ > εWb
′, all marginal-to-REBP
jobs (w′,V′) ∈ M′NC satisfy the condition
(
S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εW ′′∨S̃F(w′,VF′) < 0
)
, and therefore Equation (28) becomes
∆1
εW ′′≤εWb ′




































1−δ0 is the fraction of marginal jobs in the control group. Combining the two cases, we obtain Equation (31).
52Perfect comovement requires that, in response to the shock being considered, the average separation rate of
the marginal jobs is equal to the average separation rate of the inframarginal jobs. The same identical derivation
as in Section 5.3, paragraph “Case II: Perfect Reshuffling” applies: simply replace V′ with (w′,V′), D̃(V′, ε′′) with
D̃(w′,V′; εW ′′, εF′′), M′ and J′ with M′NC and J′NC respectively. This condition holds for any shock and any joint
density f 0post(w′;V
W ′,VF′) when there is perfect reshuffling in surplus. Additionally, it holds for only-firm-shocks
when there is perfect persistence and firm and worker surpluses are independently distributed, as discussed below.
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the non-Coasean setting (with two unilateral surpluses and participation constraints):53





































⇔ Prob(0 ≤ S̃F(w′,VF′) < εF′′ |S̃W (w′,VW ′) ≥ εWb
′)
S Prob(0 ≤ S̃F(w′,VF′) < εF′′ |0 ≤ S̃W (w′,VW ′) < εWb
′),
where f̃ 0I (w′,V





is the density of the inframarginal jobs in the control group
and f̃ 0M(w′,V





is the density of the marginal jobs in the control group.
The second step recognizes that condition S̃W (w′,VW ′) < 0 is slack without worker aggregate
shocks and with persistence in idiosyncratic surplus (i.e. for these jobs, f 0post(w′,VW ′,VF′)  0 ).
The third step clarifies that the conditions now compare two simple conditional cumulative
distribution functions of firm surplus with threshold given by the firm surplus shock, for the range
of worker surplus shocks partitioned by the REBP surplus cutoff.54
53This expression is derived by specializing Equation (27) to the case of firm shocks only, and then, analogously to

























where the second equality follows from Equation (24) (after reformulating the densities there into 1 − δ0 and 1 − δ1).
54To see this formally, note that the property of joint densities implies that f 0post(w′,V
W ′,VF′) 
f 0post(w′,V
F′ |w′,VW ′) f 0post(w′,V
W ′), we can write condition (34) as
∫
(w′ ,VW ′) s.t. S̃W (w′ ,VW ′)≥εWb
′
[∫
(w′ ,VF ′) s.t. S̃F (w′ ,VF ′)≥0 1
(
S̃F(w′ ,VF ′)<εF ′′
)
f 0post(w′ ,VF ′ |w′VW ′)d(w′ ,VF ′)
]








(w′ ,VW ′) s.t. 0≤S̃W (w′ ,VW ′)<εWb
′
[∫
(w′ ,VF ′) s.t. S̃F (w′ ,VF ′)≥0 1
(
S̃F(w′ ,VF ′)<εF ′′
)
f 0post(w′ ,VF ′ |w′ ,VW ′)d(w′ ,VF ′)
]







whichwe can rewrite in terms of surpluses directly, definingdensities of surpluses h(.) rather than of job/wage attributes
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Our empirically interesting case is:
∆1(εF′′, δ0 , δ1)  ∆0(εF′′, δ0 , δ1), (36)
such that the two post-abolition separation rates are equal for all post-REBP firm shocks and
moreover for any size of the set of marginal jobs REBP extracted (δ1 − δ0). This “global” condition
is fulfilled if worker and firm surpluses are independently distributed.55 The non-Coasean setting can
then rationalize our findings of no post-REBP resilience whatsoever even with perfect persistence
in idiosyncratic job surplus.
We show below that we can now conveniently reinterpret the mixed model within the non-
Coasean framework, and then further discuss these ingredients for the non-Coasean framework
to rationalize the full set of results.
6.3 Reinterpreting the Structural Estimation of Mixed Model
Together, Equations (31) and (36) permit us to again formulate a mixed model relating formerly
treated jobs with control groups, as a weighted average of a 45 degree line (perfect comovement
case in the firm surplus case) and the kinked piece-wise linear function (resilience in the worker
surplus case):
∆1i  κ × ∆
0
i︸︷︷︸
Coasean (or Non-Coasean) & Reshuffling
OR
Non-Coasean & Firm Shocks & Persistence











.︸                                    ︷︷                                    ︸
Coasean & Persistence
OR
Non-Coasean & Worker Shocks & Persistence
(37)
While in the data we cannot directly observe the incidence of shocks on the worker vs. firm
side driving the separations, the estimated κ of essentially one would then identify the share of











































Up until now we rewrote condition (34). Now assume that worker surplus and firm surpluses are independent:
h0post(S̃F′ |S̃W ′)  h
0
post(S̃F′). Then condition (34) collapses to equality. That is, if worker and firm surpluses are
independently distributed, ∆1(εF′′, δ0 , δ1)  ∆0(εF′′, δ0 , δ1), i.e. post-REBP separation rates co-move perfectly in
response to a firm shock even if there is perfect persistence of surplus for one period to the next.
55Of course, in practice, the shocks may be percent shifters of the given job surplus, so that the condition would not
literally need to apply in levels.
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6.4 Discussion of the Non-Coasean Framework
We now discuss the implied non-Coasean constellation, specifically high worker surplus and low firm
surplus, with limited correlation between the two, by which the non-Coasean setting rationalizes
the empirical findings. We also discuss the concrete real-world sources potentially generating
these conditions.
Initially High Worker Surplus and Low Firm Surplus Strictly interpreted, our firm-shock-only
setting assumes that no aggregate worker shocks hit. A more realistic interpretation is that worker
shocks are either smaller than firm shocks, or worker shocks are similarly sized and frequent.
But, worker surplus is initially high in our sample. This would let REBP – a massive policy shift
– extract some marginal matches that otherwise (as in the control group) would have remained
inframarginal.
High worker surplus is particularly plausible for our sample – older, and high-tenured workers
– and that exact constellation turns out to be predicted by the long-standing hypotheses of implicit
contract models, in form of backloading of compensation over the job spell (Lazear (1979, 1981)):
in a period-by-period consideration, young workers are “underpaid”, while older workers are
“overpaid.” This backloading is supported by implicit contracts or formal institutions.56 Perhaps
additionally supporting such implicit contracts (and also limiting the selectivity of layoffs, and
perhaps overall in line with the findings in Bewley, 2002) is the Austrian institutional setting,
which features an explicit consultation role for works councils in the separation process.
Lastly, Austria mandates multiple months of severance payments in the case of layoffs that
are foregone for quitters, providing little incentive for workers to quit unilaterally (despite full UI
eligibility for quitters in Austria, as discussed in Section 2).
LargeWorker Surplus Shift FromREBP For the above scenario, whenworker surplus is initially
high, the boosts to worker outside option must be large to sweep up otherwise inframarginal
workers. The exceptional size of the initial UI treatment – four years of full UI eligibility, hence also
serving as a bridge into early retirement – achieved this. In Appendix Section A, we benchmark
that, for the average worker, the cash value corresponds to 71% of annual earnings.57
Limited Correlation Between Initial Firm and Worker Surpluses In the non-Coasean setting,
the low-worker surplus jobs REBP extracted evidently were not marginal with respect to firm
surplus. Such limited correlation can arise if firm andworker gross-of-wage fundamentalsVF and
VW are uncorrelated, or if net-of-wage surpluses are in an extreme case independently distributed,
for example due to wage frictions. (By contrast, in the Coasean setting, the correlation between
56While models of job ladders and negotiation capital such as Cahuc et al. (2006) generate this joint distribution, these
models feature bilaterally efficient (re-)bargaining and separations.
57A cross-validation test is that smaller shifts in UI should not induce workers to separate. Jäger et al. (2018), which
document that wages are insulated from UI shifts, find that smaller shifts in the UI benefit level and smaller duration
extensions did not entail separation effects even among older workers and similar time periods in Austria.
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initial worker and firm surpluses is irrelevant due to rebargaining.)58 Ex post, wage patterns that
may limit the correlation of the two unilateral surpluses may in fact emerge in certain contracting
models (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; McLaughlin, 1991; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993) due to
initially set wages that then need not evolve with idiosyncratic productivity. In our model, it is
crucial that the wages are rigid and allocative at the separation margin rather than renegotiated.
In the data in Section 4, we have found evidence consistent with firm surplus – which drives
post-REBP separations – not being correlated with the REBP selection along worker surplus, as the
labor demand shocks indeed did not affect separations less among REBP cohorts. Moreover, our
complier analysis in Section 3.2 revealed that wages did not differ systematically betweenmarginal
jobs and inframarginal jobs.
7 Conclusion
Labor market quantities adjust largely along the employment (extensive) margin rather than the
hours (intensive) margin. At the micro level, such extensive-margin adjustments play out as
discrete choice problems within employment relationships of individual workers and firms that
are destroyed, maintained or formed, with a basic condition: each party must be better off inside
the job than with her respective outside option, hence enjoying surplus from the job. By this
theory, the distribution of heterogeneous job surpluses determines the level of employment, and
its adjustment (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Bils et al., 2012; Mui and Schoefer, 2019).
An open question is which theories of job formation and separation guide employment ad-
justment. According to the popular Coasean approach, the parties exploit all gains from trade by
using arbitrarily complicated and abstract contractual arrangements to transfer utility. On the ba-
sis of observed separation behavior, this Coasean view is difficult to empirically distinguish from
non-Coasean alternatives, in which wage or other frictions and institutional constraints permit
inefficient separations.
We empirically adjudicate between the Coasean and non-Coasean view by tracking jobs lon-
gitudinally over the course of the introduction and sudden abolition of a policy that subsidized
nonemployment, hence lowered job surplus, and should have entailed separations: an age-and-
region-specific extension of unemployment insurance duration from one to four years in Austria.
The Coasean view would predict resilience in the post-abolition separation behavior. By contrast,
the inefficient separations in non-Coasean models can accommodate that after the abolition, the
survivors in the treatment and control groups move in lock step – exactly in line with the data, as
58In fact, the non-Coasean model could even rationalize higher separations among the former treatment group in
response to firm shocks under a “random” wage triggering a negative correlation between worker and firm surplus:
REBP quitters would then be very underpaid – and hence particularly valuable to firms, and REBPwould have removed
low worker surplus jobs but also high firm surplus jobs. Some of our evidence may suggest such short-run “anti-
resilience”. Appendix Figure A.5 documents additional separations in the formerly treated group between 1993q3
to 1994q1 for the bottom quintile of industry growth cells. Figure 9 documents slightly more sensitive slopes in the
“hockey stick” for formerly treated cohorts. However, any such short run “phantom treatment effects” may arise from




Our revealed-preference test suggests an empirical rejection of the Coasean hypothesis, at least
in the context of the Austrian labor market among workers in their 50s in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, in response to a UI reform that boosted workers’ nonemployment outside option.
We present and discuss one specific non-Coasean mechanism, building on wage rigidity, that
can rationalize the findings, although we can not definitely pinpoint the specific sources of the
inefficiencies. Moreover, our specific case study must naturally leave for future research the
external validity of our findings, which is of substantive interest given the welfare consequences:
whether, and which, other institutional or demographic contexts can come closer to complying
with the Coasean benchmark of efficient separations. Our revealed preference test may offer an
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
1988 Job Holders Age 50 Job Holders
Non-REBP Region REBP Region Non-REBP Region REBP Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 46.560 46.721 49.751 49.751
(4.109) (4.145) (0.068) (0.068)
White Collar 0.476 0.387 0.483 0.388
(0.499) (0.487) (0.500) (0.487)
Experience 20.103 21.420 20.436 21.781
(6.353) (5.716) (6.848) (6.081)
Tenure 9.605 10.640 10.516 10.720
(5.974) (5.979) (7.187) (7.156)
Annual Earnings (1,000 EUR) 36.285 36.137 37.633 37.966
(10.876) (10.044) (11.514) (10.525)
Log Annual Earnings 3.534 3.542 3.568 3.591
(0.374) (0.326) (0.382) (0.324)
Establishment Size 625.621 553.120 615.726 581.239
(1684.252) (1037.453) (1674.651) (1107.786)
Emp. Growth at Establishment 0.247 0.267 0.212 0.255
(2.538) (4.202) (2.307) (4.302)
Emp. Growth Industry 0.052 0.028 0.054 0.028
(0.081) (0.078) (0.082) (0.077)
1(Growing Establishment) 0.457 0.408 0.422 0.353
(0.498) (0.491) (0.494) (0.478)
Observations 321,670 82,548 312,488 86,387
Note: The table reports results summary statistics for a sample of workers employed at the onset of the reform (1988q2)
in columns (1) and (2) and for a sample of workers employed in the quarter before turning 50 in columns (3) and (4).
“Non-REBP Region” and “REBP Region” refer to the labor market districts described in Section 2 and outlined in Panel
(b) of Figure 1, excluding those districts that abolished REBP in 1991. Earnings are reported in (and log earnings are
computed on) thousands of 2018 Euros. Details on the sample selection are in Section 2.3.
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Initially Employed Workers (1988 to 1993)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.109*** 0.120*** 1.461*** 0.951* -1.048***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.378) (0.531) (0.365)
REBP Region 0.003 -0.003 -0.230 -0.101 0.024
(0.044) (0.008) (0.280) (0.182) (0.677)
Treated Cohort 0.030 0.108*** 0.805*** 0.150*** 0.146
(0.026) (0.005) (0.126) (0.056) (0.391)
Constant 0.372*** 0.057*** 1.518** 0.665 16.017***
(0.098) (0.017) (0.668) (0.445) (1.820)
Observations 390,791 390,791 390,791 390,791 390,791
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.046 0.023 0.018 0.002
No of Clusters 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The table reports results of the econometric specification in (1). REBP captures the effect of REBP-eligibility on the outcomes listed in columns (1) through (5)
on a sample of workers employed at the onset of the reform (1988q2). We exclude workers born before 1933 and after 1948. Separation denotes an indicator function
that is 1 if a worker separated from their 1988-employer by the end of the REBP period (1988q2 to 1993q3). Separation into Nonemployment denotes an indicator for
Separation from the initial employer interacted with an indicator for not taking up employment with another employer. Nonemployment (Quarters), Unemployment
(Benefits) (Quarters), and Continuous Employment (Quarters) denote the quarters of nonemployment, unemployment benefits, and continuous employment with the
initial employer between 1988q2 and 1993q3. Standard errors clustered at the administrative region level are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗ 10%,
∗∗ 5%, and ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Survivors (1994 Through 1996)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.006 0.005 0.017 -0.072 -0.052
(0.009) (0.008) (0.027) (0.045) (0.034)
REBP Region -0.003 0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.116
(0.019) (0.011) (0.056) (0.041) (0.088)
Treated Cohort 0.140*** 0.164*** 0.718*** 0.145** -0.630***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.069) (0.057)
Constant 0.157*** 0.068** 0.324** 0.136 8.166***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.142) (0.107) (0.241)
Observations 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.047 0.038 0.006 0.018
No of Clusters 99 99 99 99 99
Note: The table reports results of the specification in (5). REBP captures the effect of REBP-eligibility on the outcomes listed in columns (1) through (5) on a sample of
workers employed at the same establishment in May 1988 and February 1994. We exclude workers born before 1933 and after 1948. Separation denotes an indicator
function that is 1 if a worker is not employed by their employer from February 1994 (and May 1988) in February 1996. Separation into Nonemployment denotes an
indicator for Separation from the initial employer interacted with an indicator for not being employed in February 1996. Nonemployment (Quarters), Unemployment
(Benefits) (Quarters), and Continuous Employment (Quarters) denote the quarters of nonemployment, unemployment benefits, and continuous employment with the
initial employer between February 1994 and 1996. Standard errors clustered at the administrative region level are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗
10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Table 4: Reduced-Form Evidence on Share of Separations within a Coasean Framework Following
Perfect Reshuffling vs. Perfect Persistence of Job-Level Surplus: Cohort-Region Cells
1995 1996 1997 1998
ακ (Reshuffling) 1.027 1.084 1.237 1.338
(0.034) (0.030) (0.040) (0.047)
95% CI 0.960 1.025 1.158 1.245
(Lower Limit)
α1−κ (Persistence) -0.037 -0.070 -0.208 -0.289
(0.035) (0.030) (0.041) (0.048)
R2 0.929 0.960 0.971 0.978
N 181 181 181 181
Note: The table reports estimates of the coefficients in Equation (20). We regress the post-REBP separation rate from
February 1994 to February of each year among REBP stayers in the REBP region, by month of birth, on both the
separation rate among stayers in the non-REBP region and the predicted separation rate based on a perfect persistence
Coasean model. We weight the observations of the month of birth by the number of employed workers born in that
month and report standard errors clustered at the administrative region level.
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Table 5: Structural Estimation of Share κ of Separations within a Coasean Framework with Perfect
Reshuffling of Job-Level Surplus: Industry-Occupation Cells
2-Digit Industry × Occupation Cells 4-Digit Industry × Occupation Cells
1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
κ (Reshuffling) 1.046 1.077 1.053 1.158 1.027 1.077 1.119 1.169
(0.054) (0.067) (0.080) (0.099) (0.070) (0.066) (0.076) (0.074)
95% CI 0.939 0.943 0.894 0.962 0.890 0.947 0.968 1.023
(Lower Limit)
R2 0.426 0.531 0.588 0.528 0.174 0.278 0.273 0.275
N 95 95 95 95 262 262 262 262
Note: The table reports estimates of κ based on estimation of Equation (20) with non-linear least squares allowing for an
intercept shift. We collapse the data at the industry by occupation (blue/white collar) level andweight each observation
by the number of workers in the cell, dropping cells with fewer than ten workers who survived REBP and those cells
with a smaller separation rate in the REBP compared to the non-REBP region during the program (27.8 and 38.6% of
cells for 2-digit and 4-digit industry cuts, respectively). The outcome variable is the separation rate from February 1994
to February of each year among REBP survivors in the REBP region. The model includes the corresponding separation
rate among control workers (cohorts born between 1933 and 1943 but ineligible due to location in the control regions)
as the main regressor along with its transformations according to Equation (20).
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Figures
Figure 1: The Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP)




























Treatment Group: REBP Region 50+
Young Control Group: 40-49 (REBP and Non-REBP Region)
Old Control Group: Non-REBP Region 50+
(b) Map of REBP Treatment and Control Regions
Note: Panel (a) shows the timeline of reform changes in potential benefit duration for eligible workers in REBP and
control regions. It shows the maximum length of benefits for individuals aged 50 or older in the highest experience
category (at least 9 years during the past 15 years), which increased from 30 to 209 weeks starting July 1988. Individuals
who have worked less have a lower maximum benefit duration: If they have worked at least 6 years during the past 10
years, they experience an increase from 30 to 39 weeks in August 1989; if they have worked at least 3 years during the
past 5 years, their maximum length of unemployment stays constant at 30 weeks over the whole time period. It also
shows the maximum length of unemployment insurance for individuals aged 40-49 who fall into the highest experience
category: individuals in this category have worked at least 6 years during the past 10 years. In August 1989, maximum
benefit duration increased from 30 to 39 weeks. (The maximum length of unemployment stays constant at 30 weeks for
individuals who haveworked at least 3 years during the past 5 years.) Panel (b) depicts amap of Austrianmunicipalities
showing the REBP regions. REBP was introduced in TR1 and TR2 in 1988. TR2, REBP was in place until the end of
1991. In TR2, REBP was in place until July 31, 1993. Source for map: Inderbitzin et al. (2016), Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Benefit Extensions and Separations
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Note: Panel (a) shows the share of workers who separated from their 1988q2-employer (right before the reform) by
1993q3 (when reform had just ended). Panel (c) shows the share of workers who have separated from their employer
in the quarter before turning 50 by the quarter before turning 55, i.e. the age range where REBP extended benefits for
eligible workers. Both plot rates by month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid)
regions. Panels (b) and (d) show the difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts born after
1943 were not covered by the policy as they turned 50 after the program was abolished 1993.
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Figure 3: Benefit Extensions and Employment Outcomes
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Note: Panels (a) and (c) show the average number of quarters that the workers are nonemployed and on unemployment
benefits, respectively, until the quarter after the end of the REBP (1993q3), among those employed in the quarter before
the start of the REBP (1988q2). Both plot rates by month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP
(blue, solid) regions. Panels (b) and (d) show the difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts
born after 1943 were not covered by the policy as they turned 50 after the program was abolished in 1993.
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Figure 4: Complier Characteristics and Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
(a) Visualizing the Approach
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(b) Difference in Characteristics
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(c) Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
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Note: Panel (a) outlines how we create the groups of Always-Separators, Compliers, and Never-Separators using the
procedure outlined in Section C. It first shows the separation rate among employed workers in 1988q2 by 1993q3, when
REBP was abolished, by region and cohort eligibility. It then shows how the share of Always-Separators is made up
of the separations among the ineligible age cohorts in the REBP region adjusted for the difference between age cohorts
using values from the control region. Any separations in excess of this value are the REBP compliers. Then the share of
never-separators are the stayers in the REBP region among the eligible cohort. Panel (b) shows the difference between
the averages for compliers and always-separators (C-A) as well as for compliers and never-separators (C-N) that are
reported in Appendix Table A.2. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors from 1,000 bootstrap replications
blocked at the administrative region level. See Sections C and D for more details on how the variables are constructed.
See Section C for the methodology underlying the decomposition into the groups of compliers, never-separators, and
always-separators. Panel (c) shows the heterogeneity in the treatment effect of REBP across different characteristics.
For binary characteristics (e.g., Blue Collar), we report the treatment effect for each group (1 in red circles, 0 in blue
squares). For continuous variables (e.g., earnings), we report the treatment effect on the sample above and below the
median (red circles and blue squares respectively). The estimated treatment effect on the full sample is reported at the
top with a maroon triangle and the vertical dashed line.
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Figure 5: Intuitions for Empirical Design: Distribution of Job Surplus, Pre- and Post-REBP
(a) Distribution of Job Surplus at the Onset of REBP, both Treated and Control Regions
0 ΔS S
(b) Distribution of Job Surplus at the End of REBP,
Treated regions
0 ΔS S
(c) Distribution of Job Surplus at the End of REBP,
Control regions
0 ΔS S
Note: Panel (a) shows a hypothetical distribution of gross-of-REBP joint job surplus realizations during REBP (in terms
of the model, after Markov process k(V′ |V) has taken place). The vertical dashed lines represent the zero surplus and
the REBP surplus shifter. The light blue solid region to the left of the zero line, making up share δ0 of the total mass,
represents the “always separators,” meaning those values of gross surplus which will trigger a separation regardless of
REBP. The red polka-dotted region between the two vertical lines, making up share δ1 − δ0 of the total, represents the
marginal jobs, which separate if subject to REBP but remain active otherwise. The green dashed region to the right of
the REBP line, a share 1 − δ1 of the total, represents the inframarginal active jobs, whose surplus is sufficiently high for
feasibility even if subject to REBP. Panels (b) and (c) plot the distributions right after the REBP shock hits (in terms of the
model, after the REBP shock but before Markov process K(V′′ |V′)), respectively in the treated regions and in the control
regions. In the treated regions (Panel (b)), 100%(= 1−δ
1
1−δ1 ) of the surviving jobs have gross surplus greater than the REBP
surplus shifter; in the control regions (Panel (c)) fraction δ
1−δ0
1−δ0 of the surviving jobs have gross surplus between 0 and
the REBP surplus shifter (marginal jobs) and a fraction 1−δ
1
1−δ0 have gross surplus greater than the REBP surplus shifter
(inframarginal jobs).
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Note: The figure shows, by month of birth, the share of workers observed in the same establishment between 1988q2
and 1994q1 who separate from that employer by Q1 of each subsequent year. The sample is split into REBP (red, short
dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid) regions. The yellow dashed line plots the predicted Coasean separation rate using
Equation (18) (perfect persistence case). The retirement age for Austrian men was 60 years old in this period, which
explains the spike in separations among older cohorts.
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Note: The figure shows, by month of birth, the difference in separation rates from Figure 6 between the REBP and
non-REBP regions (red, solid). The yellow dashed line plots the predicted Coasean separation rate using Equation (18)
(perfect persistence case).
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Figure 8: Difference by Industry Growth, REBP vs. Non-REBP Region: Separation Rate of “REBP
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Note: These figures split the by-cohort regional difference from Figure 7 into terciles of industry growth, with the
first tercile denoting the lowest and the third tercile denoting the highest industry growth. Specifically, we calculate
employment growth between February 1994 and the given year for each industry, among all workers (not just stayers)
born 1938 or later to avoid those who are retiring. We then assign REBP stayers to the industries of their REBP-period
establishments. We calculate growth rates for industries at the two-digit NACE level.
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Figure 9: Establishment-Level “Hockey-Sticks”, 1994 to 1996
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Note: These figures plot the results of an analysis focusing on labor demand shifts within establishments. In an
attempt to confirm the “hockey-stick” relationship between separations and employment growth at the establishment
level (Davis et al., 2013) in the Austrian setting, Panel (a) plots annual separation rates for male workers employed
in a given year by bins of annual establishment employment growth rates (first quarter of every year), pooling years
1994 through 1996 and excluding the steel sector. Panel (b) focuses on separations among the four relevant groups
tracked throughout the paper: REBP-eligible and -ineligible birth cohorts and regions, while still plotting against total
establishment employment growth. We ignore the cohorts born before 1936 since they have reached retirement age
in 1996. Panel (c) plots the slope of the cohort-specific relationship between separations and establishment growth
(1994-1996) among shrinking establishments for each year of birth and split between the REBP and non-REBP regions.
We adjust throughout for spurious layoffs due to mergers, take-overs, and administrative changes to the ASSD using
the procedure outlined in Fink et al. (2010).
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Figure 10: Conceptual Framework (Perfect Persistence): Separations and Shocks
(a) Case Studies of Jobs
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(b) Empirical Strategy: Separation Rates
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Note: The figures plot the dynamics of job separations in the model, in the Coasean (efficient bargaining) and non-
Coasean (fixed-wage) settings. Panel (a) plots job case studies in the two-dimensional space of worker and firm
components of joint job surplus, and net of wage surpluses. Panel (b) plots the relationship between treatment group
and control group separation rates, after REBP, for the Coasean (assuming perfect persistence of job surplus) and non-
Coasean setting. Panels (c) and (d) plot the separations in the former treatment group (∆1) and former control group
(∆0) in response to worker (c) and firm (d) side surplus shocks, after REBP, for the Coasean and non-Coasean settings.
∆1Coasean is plotted assuming perfect persistence in job surplus between the end of REBP and the subsequent period.
Sections 5 and 6 describe the model and the exercises in detail.
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Figure 11: Conceptual Framework: Distribution of Job Surplus and Separations
(a.C) Coasean, UI Benefit Increase
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(b.C) Coasean, Post-REBP, Treated
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(b.NC) Non-Coasean, Post-REBP, Treated
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Note: The figure illustrates the model dynamics of job separations, described in Sections 5 and 6, in the Coasean (efficient bargaining, upper panels) and non-Coasean (fixed-wage, lower
panels) settings. The figures assume perfect persistence in job surplus between the end of REBP and the subsequent period. The figures plot contour maps of the density of the joint
distribution of firm (y-axis) and worker (x-axis) surpluses; darker shades indicate higher densities, drawn from a bivariate normal distribution. The [non-]Coasean surplus notions are
gross[net]-of-wage fundamentals. Panels (a.C) and (a.NC) plot the selection of jobs surviving REBP in the treatment [control] group in the upper [lower] contour map within each panel
a.C and a.NC. Panels (b.C) and (b.NC) [(c.C) and (c.NC)] plot post-REBP sensitivity of separations separately among the former treatment [control] group to post-REBP shocks to worker
and firm surplus.
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Figure 12: Post-REBP SeparationRates of REBP Survivors and non-REBP Survivors at the Industry-
Occupation Level
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Note: The figures plot binned scatter plots of the post-REBP separation rates at the industry-by-occupation cell level
among survivors in the REBP regions against those in the same cell in the non-REBP regions. The blue dots indicate the
relationship for cohorts born between 1938 and 1943, i.e. those who were eligible for the REBP before its abolition. As a
placebo, we also show the relationship for slightly younger cohorts, born between 1943 and 1948 and thus never eligible
for the REBP. Observations are weighted by the number of survivors in the respective control-region cell. Industries are
categorized at the four-digit level.
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Note: The figure plots separation effects, estimated resilience and control region separation rates by quintiles of predicted
nonemployment risk. We calculate nonemployment risk by selecting the set of workers employed in 1982 and measure
whether they experienced a long nonemployment spell by 1987 (i.e. before the REBP reform). In this sample, we
regress an indicator for experiencing a consecutive nonemployment spell of more than one year on (15) industry fixed
effects, an indicator for white-collar occupations, cubic polynomials in tenure and experience (in the last 25 years),
and the local unemployment rate at the municipal level. We then use the estimated coefficients to predict long-term
nonemployment risk among the sample of workers employed in 1988 before the REBP became active and groupworkers
into five quintiles based on this measure. The navy hollow squares plot the effect of the REBP on separations in each
of the five cells. The green hollow triangles are the post-REBP separation effects among survivors by 1995 (negative
value would indicate resilience). Finally, the maroon solid circles plot the control region separation rate among peer
old cohorts in the non-REBP region (during the REBP).
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Online Appendix of:
Marginal Jobs and Job Surplus:
A Test of the Efficiency of Separations
Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer, and Josef Zweimüller
A Quantifying Worker’s Value of the REBP UI Extension
We calculate the cash value of extended benefits following the approach in Card et al. (2007) and
complement it with new data on unemployment assistance (UA, “Notstandshilfe” in German).
Our estimate for the average cash value of the reform corresponds to about eight to nine months
of pay or 71% of a worker’s annual salary.
The REBP changed potential UI benefit duration from 30 or 52 weeks to 209 weeks for older
workers (see Figure 1 Panel (a)).59 To provide a conservative estimate of the value of the reform, we
take 52 weeks as the alternative potential benefit duration. Under this assumption, REBP changed
benefits by 157 weeks or 36.1315 months.
When benefits run out, manyworkers are eligible for lowerUAbenefits. UAbenefits aremeans-
tested and depend on other (spousal) sources of income aswell as the number of dependents. They
are capped at 0.92 of the worker’s UI benefits, according to the formula
UA  min{0.92 ×UI,max{0, 0.95 · UI − Spousal Earnings +Dependent Allowances}}. (A1)
To impute counterfactual UA payments, we draw on data from the AMS, the Austrian employment
agency, on unemployment benefit and UA receipt. This allows us to observe actually paid out UI
and UA benefits. We draw on data from a period when both UI and UA payments are observed
in the AMS data (2001-2009), and zoom in on workers whose UI benefits ran out and who did not
take up employment in the subsequent 60 days. We then calculate the average ratio of UA to UI
benefits. We assign everyone zero UA benefits if they do not receive UA benefits in the 60 days
after UI benefits ran out, even though they may have been eligible for non-zero UA benefits but
did not take them up. In our sample, we find that the average UA benefit corresponds to 50.5% of
previous UI benefits.
The average replacement rate between 1988 and 1993 was 40.0%. We calculate the average
replacement rate forworkers in eligible cohorts in theREBP regionby simply assigning replacement
rates to workers based on their earnings and averaging over workers from 1988 to 1993.
As a final input into our calculation, we account for the fact that benefits are not taxed. The
average tax rate for personal income in Austria was 11.2% after a 1989 tax reform (OECD, 1990).
In addition, employee-borne payroll taxes of about 18% were levied on wages.60 We thus scale
up UI and UA benefits relative to gross income by 1/((1 − τaverage)(1 − τSoc. Sec.average )) to account for
non-taxation of benefits.
59For most of the treatment period, since 1989, the potential benefit duration for older workers was 52 weeks. Until
1989, the potential benefit duration was 30 weeks.
60Specifically, the total payroll taxes contribution rates for workers and firms were, in sum, 34.5% for blue- and 38.6%
forwhite-collar workers (OECD, 1990). In our sample, about 35.4% ofworkers among 1988 job holders werewhite-collar
workers so that the average social security contribution rate is 0.345 · (1−0.354)+0.386 ·0.354 ' 0.36, leading to a worker
contribution rate of 18%.
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We can then calculate the cash value of the reform to the average worker according to the
formula:




× (1 − 0.505)︸       ︷︷       ︸
(UI RR - UA RRUI RR )
× ((1 − 0.115)(1 − 0.18))−1︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
((1−τaverage)(1−τSoc. Sec.average ))−1
×w ' 8.494 · w , (A2)
where w denotes the average worker’s monthly gross wage and RR denotes replacement rates.
According to this calculation, the average cash value of the REBP reform to workers was about
eight to nine months of salary or 71% of an annual salary.61
61Wages in Austria are paid based in 14, rather than 12, installments. The additional two installments are incorporated
in the calculation of UI benefits. The monthly wage we mention above corresponds to an average wage corresponding
to the annual salary divided by 12.
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B Worker Survey
To complement our model-driven test that sorted workers by the economic concept of job surplus,
we provide evidence on classifications of REBP separations into subjective categories reported by
workers themselves.
B.1 Classifying REBP Separations: Survey and Administrative Data
We now study micro-level survey data and an administrative measure to study the nature of the
separations induced by the outside option shift. We find that workers largely perceived these
separations to be amicable quits and early retirement.
Survey: Micro Census The Austrian Micro Census (“Mikrozensus”) is the largest continuous
survey of the Austrian population. The Austrian Micro Census samples representatively based on
administrative population registries and follows a rotating panel of households. We additionally
use this survey to trace the nature of separations by type (quits, layoffs, other reasons) as it contains
information on the reasons for the ends of nonemployedworker’s last job, starting in 1995. For jobs
that ended within the last eight years, respondents report the reason for the separation as follows:
1. a one-sided or amicable quit,
2. a layoff due to establishment closure,
3. a layoff due to economic reasons,
4. a layoff due to other reasons,
5. early retirement, incl. limited employability and health,62
6. regular retirement, or
7. other reasons (incl. expiration of fixed term contracts, civil service, and a residual, unclassi-
fied category).
As a basis for this analysis, we replicate the REBP treatment effect on separations in the micro
census sample.
Validation of Micro Census: Replicating the Treatment Effect of REBP on Separations We
validate whether the REBP led to excess separations in our micro census sample. Figure A.1 plots
an indicator for whether the last employment spell of a nonemployed respondent ended when the
respondent was between 50 and 54 years old, the effective age range when extended benefits were
available under REBP. The Figure shows averages of the indicator by cohort and region. As in the
analysis based on administrative data, the analysis based on the Microcensus survey data clearly
documents excess separations in the REBP regions for cohorts affected by the reform – those born
between 1933 and 1943. The lines of the REBP and the control regions are parallel and in fact
almost lie on top of one another outside of the treatment cohorts.
62The questionnaire and survey manual clarify that “early retirement” is supposed to encompass these additional
categories.
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Note: The figure plots data based on the AustrianMicrocensus. Across cohorts and regions, it plots an indicator variable
for whether a respondent’s last employment spell ended in the time when a respondent was between 50 and 54 years
old. The two red vertical lines denote the oldest and youngest cohorts, respectively, whowere eligible for REBP between
1988 and 1993 and were aged between 50 and 54 at some point in that time range.
Composition Shifts in Separation Types We focus on the sample of respondents whose job
ended when they were between 50 and 54 years old. We estimate a difference-in-differences
model with cohort and region effects from Equation (1), with indicator variables for last job ending
between the ages of 50 and 54 in a respective separation type.
FigureA.2(a) plots the difference-in-difference treatment effects of REBP on these seven types of
separation indicators and documents that the largest categories of separation types are classified
as early retirement and retirement for other reasons as well as quits, including amicable quits.
Specifically, we find a statistically significant, positive effect of REBP on quits among older workers
of about 0.7 ppt and effects of about 1.5 ppt for both early retirement and retirement for other
reasons. Figure A.2(a) also provides some evidence for a small and positive effect on layoffs due
to economic reasons with an effect size of about 0.5 ppt, about a tenth of the overall increase
in separations. The effects on layoffs due to closure or for other reasons are much smaller, and
statistically not significant. In a next step, we dissect the reasons for the additional quits into (i)
personal or family circumstances, (ii) sickness or disability, or (iii) other reasons (Figure A.2(b)).
Strikingly, almost half were due to sickness or disability.
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Figure A.2: Effect of REBP on Quits and Mutual Separations between Age 50 and 54
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Note: The figures plot data on quits from two sources. Panels (a) and (b) plots outcomes based on the Austrian
Microcensus and show treatment effects for REBP in a difference-in-difference specification controlling for region and
cohort fixed effects on types of separation (a) and, more specifically, types of quits (b). The seven outcome variables
that we consider in (a) are indicators that equal one if a respondent’s last employment spell ended between the ages of
50 and 54 and was either a one-sided or amicable quit, a layoff due to establishment closure, a layoff due to economic
reasons, a layoff for other reasons, early retirement, regular retirement, or for other reasons. The three outcome variables
that we consider in (b) are indicators that equal one if a respondent’s last employment spell ended between the ages
of 50 and 54 and was a quit and was either (i) due to personal or family circumstances, (ii) sickness or disability, or
(iii) other reasons. Each estimate stems from a separate regression based on 180,137 observations. As a baseline for
(a), the values in the control region (among workers from REBP-eligible cohorts) are Quit (amicable or not): 0.00697;
Layoff (closure): 0.00346; Layoff (economic reason): 0.0036; Layoff (other): 0.00275; Early Retirement: 0.0350; Regular
Retirement: 0.0126; Other: 0.0383. For (b), control region values are Personal or family circumstances: 0.00182; Sickness
or disability: 0.00389; Other reasons: 0.00126. The red vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals based on standard
errors clustered at the administrative region level. Using the Austrian Social Security Dataset, Panels (c) and (d) plots
an indicator for those who do not take up UI until at least 28 days (the waiting period for quitters to receive UI) after
the end of any of their employment spells between the ages of 50 and 55. Note that there could be quitters who decide
never to receive UI (see Section B.1) or who find re-employment before the end of the 28-day window.
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C Complier Characteristics in Difference-in-Differences IV Settings
C.1 Methodology
Here, we provide the detailed, stand-alone methodological guide deriving and formalizing com-
plier analysis in difference-in-differences contexts. For illustrative purposes, we follow the example
of a program implemented across different regions and cohorts. To our knowledge, ours is the first
characterization of sufficient conditions for complier analysis in difference-in-differences contexts.
We complement recent advances to extend instrumental variable approaches to the difference-
in-differences framework (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2018; Hudson et al., 2017)) and
build on the proof in Abadie (2003).
Setup We set up a potential outcomes framework for the difference-in-differences model (1)
estimating the effect of REBP on separations among workers holding a job in pre-REBP in 1988,
with fixed effects for region r and cohort c. D ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether a given worker separates
from their initial, pre-reform job by the end of the reform period (whether she was treated or
not). Z ∈ {0, 1} captures whether workers are REBP-eligible (1) or not (0). D0 and D1 denote the
potential values of D for Z  0 and Z  1 (D  ZD1+ (1−Z)D0). REBP varied by region r ∈ {r0 , r1}
and cohort c ∈ {c0 , c1}. r0 is the control region and r1 is the REBP region. c0 (c1) denotes ineligible
(eligible) cohorts. We thus have that Z  1 for (r1 , c1) only, and Z  0 for other combinations
(r1 , c0), (r0 , c0) and (r0 , c1). Always-Separators have potential outcomes (D0  1,D1  1) and share
πAS. Never-Separators have potential outcomes (D0  0,D1  0) and share πNS. Compliers –marginal
jobs – have potential outcomes (D0  0,D1  1) and share πC. Even though individual compliers
cannot be identified, we can identify the characteristics of compliers, i.e. E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  0].
Identification Assumptions Wemake the following four assumptions to estimate complier char-
acteristics in the difference-in-differences design. The assumptions are mostly common ones in
an instrumental variables setup. For extending complier analysis to difference-in-differences set-
tings, we additionally make an independence assumption for characteristics and assume additive
separability for attributes.
A.1: First Stage For all r ∈ (r0 , r1) and c ∈ (c0 , c1), P(D1  1|r, c) > P(D0  1|r, c).
Intuitively, Assumption 1 implies that more separations take place under the reform and ensures
the existence of compliers.
A.2: Monotonicity D1 − D0 ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 rules out defiers, i.e. individuals that would separate if benefits are not extended
but would not separate if unemployment benefits are more generous.
A.3: Independence (D0 ,D1 , x) ⊥ Z |(r, c).
The independence assumption posits that conditional on r and c, the instrument Z is orthogonal
to potential outcomes D0, and D1 and, extending the usual assumptions in instrumental variables
settings, also to attributes x.
A.4: Additive Separability For all d , d′ ∈ {0, 1},
P(D0  d ,D1  d′ |c1 , r) − P(D0  d ,D1  d′ |c0 , r) and E[x |c1 , r,D0  d ,D1  d′] −
E[x |c0 , r,D0  d ,D1  d′] do not depend on r.
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The additive separability assumption for characteristics x is analogous to assumptions for par-
allel trends or additive separability in recent work extending the instrumental variables setup
to difference-in-differences settings (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2018), Hudson et al.
(2017)). A testable implication ofAssumption 4 thatwebring to thedata is thatE[x |c1 , r]−E[x |c0 , r]
does not depend on r. This is equivalent to saying that the between-cohort differences in the job
attribute distribution are the same across regions, specifically among marginal jobs.
Identifying Characteristics Since Z does not vary conditional on region and cohort, we only
observe either Z  0, or Z  1, for a given region and cohort cell. Under the first stage and
monotonicity assumption, the expected value of complier characteristics can be represented as a
function of observable quantities for all region/cohort combinations.
We can rewrite the conditional expectation of individuals with D1  1 in region r and from
cohort c as follows:
E[x |D1  1, r, c]  E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  1] · P(D0  1|r, c ,D1  1)
+E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  0] · P(D0  0|r, c ,D1  1).
(A3)
Rearranging yields
E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  0]  1P(D00|r,c ,D11) ·E[x |r, c ,D1  1]
−P(D01|r,c ,D11)P(D00|r,c ,D11)E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  1].
(A4)
By monotonicity (D1 − D0 ≥ 0), we have that E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  1]  E[x |r, c ,D0  1], which
implies:
E[x |r, c ,D1  1,D0  0]  1P(D00|r,c ,D11) ·E[x |r, c ,D1  1]
−P(D01|r,c ,D11)P(D00|r,c ,D11)E[x |r, c ,D0  1].
(A5)
Using the definition of conditional probabilities, P(D0  1|r, c ,D1  1)  P(D01,D11|r,c)P(D1|r,c) and
P(D0  0|r, c ,D1  1)  P(D0,D11|r,c)P(D11|r,c) . Define the (conditional on region and cohort) probability
of always-separators as πArc  P(D0  1,D1  1|r, c), of never-separators as πNrc  P(D0  0,D1 
0|r, c) and by monotonicity of compliers as πCrc  P(D0  0,D1  1|r, c)  1 − πArc − πNrc . The
conditional expectation term above can then be expressed as follows:











E[x |r, c ,D0  1].
(A6)
Equation (A6) shows that complier characteristics are identified in a difference-in-difference IV
setting. We can construct sample analogues to each of the terms on the right-hand side as follows
by drawing on the independence and additive separability assumption. The following exposition
follows the case of calculating characteristics conditional on (r, c)  (r1 , c1). By independence, we
have that:
E[x |r1 , c1 ,D1  1]  E[x |r1 , c1 ,D  1, Z  1]. (A7)
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By independence and additive separability in x, we have:
E[x |r1 , c1 ,D0  1]  E[x |r1 , c0 ,D0  1] + (E[x |r0 , c1 ,D0  1] −E[x |r0 , c0 ,D0  1])
 E[x |r1 , c0 ,D  1, Z  0] (A8)
+E[x |r0 , c1 ,D  1, Z  0]
−E[x |r0 , c0 ,D  1, Z  0]. (A9)
Sample analogues exist for each of the right-hand side terms in (A7) and (A8):
























where Nr1 ,c1 is the number of observations in (r1 , c1) and so forth.
For the conditional probabilities in (A6) note that (using independence and the additive sepa-
rability in D assumption):
πArc  P(D0  1,D1  1|r1 , c1)  P(D0  1|r1 , c1)
 P(D0  1|r1 , c0) + P(D0  1|r0 , c1) − P(D0  1|r0 , c0) (A14)
 E(D |Z  0, r1 , c0) + E(D |Z  0, r0 , c1) − E(D |Z  0, r0 , c0)
πNrc  P(D0  0,D1  0|r1 , c1)  P(D1  0|r1 , c1)
 P(D  0|Z  1, r1 , c1) (A15)
 1 − E(D |Z  1, r1 , c1).
These quantities can be estimated in the regression:
Dirc  β + φr + ψc + νZrc + χirc . (A16)
The sample estimators are then given by πArc  β̂ + φ̂r + ψ̂c , πNrc  1 − β̂ − φ̂r − ψ̂c − ν̂ and
πCrc  1 − πNrc − πArc  ν̂. All objects on the right-hand side of (A6) thus have estimable sample
counterparts.
Extensions Under additional assumptions, we can alternatively estimate the conditional expec-
tations in (A6) in a regression framework. Specifically, if trends in x are the same for always-
separators, always-separators and compliers, never-separators, and never-separators and compli-
ers, the conditional expectations of characteristics can be estimated from the regression below:
xirc  α + κr + λc + ωDirc + γZrc + ϕDirc × Zrc + εirc . (A17)
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This regression implies common trends across the four identified groups since the values of D and
Z do not affect the trends κ, λ. The sample estimators areE[x |r, c ,D1  1]  α̂+ κ̂r + λ̂c + ω̂+ γ̂+ ϕ̂,
and E[x |r, c ,D0  1]  α̂ + κ̂r + λ̂c + ω̂.
Under slightly weaker assumptions, not requiring us to assume parallel trends for never-
separators and compliers, we can use the following regression to estimate the required conditional
expectations in Equation (A6) by interacting the trend variables with D so that we can estimate
separate trends for (1) always-separators and (2) never-separators and compliers:
xirc  α + κr + λc + ωDirc + κ̃r × Dirc + λ̃c × Dirc + γZrc + ϕDirc × Zrc + εirc (A18)
We then have E[x |r, c ,D0  1]  α + κr + λc + ω + κ̃r + λ̃c and E[x |r, c ,D1  1]  α + κr + λc +
ω + κ̃r + λ̃c + γ + ϕ. Our approach can also be extended to estimate complier characteristics in the
Z  0 cells if one of the following assumptions holds:
Assumption 5 (a). Cohort and region trends are the same for always-separators
and compliers, or
Assumption 5 (b). Cohort and region trends are the same for always-separators and
never-separators and either the proportion of compliers or never-separators is constant
across cohort and region.
C.2 Estimation Procedure for Complier Characteristics
We describe the non-parametric bootstrapping procedure for inference. We use bootstrap samples
of all employed men in 1988q2 working in either the non-REBP region or the region where REBP
was abolished in 1993. As in the DiD specifications (Tables 2 through 3), we take samples by ran-
dom clusters of administrative region.63 Specifically, we take blocks of the NUTS 3 designations for
Austria, which consist of labor market districts (Bezirke) within the Austrian states (Bundesländer).
For each of the 1,000 random samplings of administrative regions, we
1. Estimmate the proportion of always-separators, never-separators, and compliers using Equa-
tions (A14) and (A15).
2. Estimate the average of each outcome among compliers, always-separators, and never-
separators by calculating the relevant conditional means.
3. Estimate regional and cohort averages to investigate parallel trends (see Table A.1). Specifi-
cally, for each outcome Yi , we run the DiD specification
Yi  β + φr + ψc + νZrc + χirc (A19)
where every individual i is in region r (REBP vs. non-REBP) and cohort c (REBP-eligible vs.
ineligible). Then,
• For column (1) in Table A.1, the difference between the eligible and ineligible cohorts in
the non-REBP region is ψ̂c .
• For column (2) in Table A.1, the cohort difference in the REBP region is ψ̂c + ν̂.
• For column (3) in Table A.1, the difference-in-differences is ν̂.
63In practice, we use the bsample command in Stata with the cluster option.
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4. Investigate treatment effect heterogeneity.
• Specifically, we create indicators forwhether the individual is above or below themedian
value of each characteristic for continuous variables like earnings and an indicator for
each value for binary characteristics like being in a blue-collar occupation.
• We run the DiD specification in Equation (1) separately for each group.64
• Wekeep the two estimates of ν̂ and also takedifferences for the final columnofAppendix
Table A.2.
The final output is 1,000 estimates of each value of interest, one from each random sample of
districts. The reported standard errors are the standard deviation of these 1,000 estimates. The
reported point estimates are the same specifications run on the full sample.
C.3 Detailed Discussion: Results of Complier Analysis
Here we discuss the results of the complier analysis, summarized in the main text in Section 3.2
and in Figure 4 and Appendix Tables A.1 (baseline differences) and A.2 (complier characteristics
compared to always- and never-separators).
Blue vs. White Collar Occupations An analysis of the occupational structure of marginal jobs
(for data reasons limited to a classification into blue- and white-collar occupations) reveals that
82.3% of marginal jobs are in blue-collar occupations while the share of blue-collar workers among
both always- and never-separators are lower at 67.9% and 50.5%, respectively. When analyzing
treatment effect heterogeneity, we also find stronger effects of the REBP on separations among
blue-collar workers.
We also, in unreported results, considered the share of marginal jobs across industries and
founda concentration inmanual labor-intensive sectors suchasminingormanufacturing. Virtually
no marginal jobs exist in high-skilled, white-collar sectors such as health or banking.
Worker Codetermination, Works Councils, and Establishment Size We investigate whether
compliers are particularly likely to originate from establishments with stronger worker codeter-
mination through the works council. To do so, we explore the size cutoffs at 5, 20, 100, and 1,000
employees. At each threshold, the codetermination rights of workers are strengthened.65 As de-
scribed in Section 2, workers can form a works council starting at establishment with five or more
employees. In establishments with more than 20 employees, employer-works council agreements
can be formed to take older workers’ interests into consideration. In establishments with more
than 100 employees, the local employment agency needs to be notified before sizable layoffs of
workers. Finally, the works council can appeal to an external arbitration committee, e.g., in case of
layoffs, when employment crosses a 200-employee threshold.
Our results show clear differences between compliers and never-separators across establish-
ment size thresholds. Specifically, marginal jobs are more likely than never-separators to come
from very large establishments where works councils can appeal to external arbitration commit-
tees (85.9% vs. 54.4%). This pattern is consistent with stronger codetermination through works
councils lending formal institutional support to implicit contracts as described in Lazear (1979,
64Equivalently, we fully interact the DiD specification with the indicator.
65Of course, other attributes also vary with establishment size so our analysis of worker codetermination and estab-
lishment size does not definitively pin down only variation in codetermination. See Jäger and Schoefer (2019) for more
evidence on the effects of codetermination in the related context of Germany.
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1981) and Bewley (2002) and potentially consistent with our alternative non-Coasean framework
described in Section 5.
Employment Growth: Industry and Establishment Level Marginal jobs stem from industries
or establishments with stagnating or declining labor demand. This complier attribute represents
industry and establishment employment growth rates in the pre-period from 1982 to 1987.66 The
analysis reveals that marginal jobs stem from declining industries which had a negative growth
rate of -0.4ppt in the pre-period while both always- and never-separators come from moderately
growing industries with positive growth rates of around 4.4 and 2.5ppt in the same time frame.
The pattern is more pronounced at the establishment level, where we find that compliers stem
from establishments with a negative average growth of -17.2ppt while never-separators stem
from establishments with positive growth of 10.2ppt. Relatedly, only 11% of marginal jobs stem
from establishments with positive employment growth in the pre-period while the shares of
both always- and never-separators in growing establishments are substantially higher at 37.3%
and 56.3%, respectively. Mirroring the complier characteristics, we also find that employment
growth at the industry and establishment level correlates negatively with the treatment effect on
separations, documenting that the REBP led to more separations when industries or firms were
in decline. Overall, the evidence documents robustly that marginal jobs occurred in sectors and
establishments that were declining, consistent with a low or decreasing joint surplus, worker
surplus (lower expected continuation value), or firm surplus (at a givenwage). It is consistent with
a narrative in which REBP managed to buffer and perhaps accelerate labor market adjustment to
some degree (since the compliers are, by construction, still present in the peer employers in the
control regions and cohorts).
Earnings Annual earnings of compliers and never-separators are statistically indistinguishable
(EUR 37,700 vs EUR 37,920, CPI-adjusted to 2018). Similarly, the earnings of compliers and always-
separators are also not distinguishable at the 5% level. Relatedly, we do not find statistically
significant treatment effect heterogeneity by earnings, conditional on the other covariates, in our
estimation of treatment effect heterogeneity.
We further analyze AKM-specifications (Abowd et al., 1999) in the pre-period before 1988 and
find that compliers and never-separators have similar firm and worker effects, with the point evi-
dence perhaps pointing towards lower worker effects compared to never-separators. We estimate
the following AKMmodel:
ln wit  αi + ψ J(i ,t) + X′itφ + νit ,
where αi and ψ J(i ,t) denote worker and establishment fixed effects. Control vector Xit comprises a
third-order polynomial in age. Worker effects αi can be interpreted as the permanent component
of wages workers command irrespective of the particular employer. Establishment effects ψ J(i ,t)
capture the wage premium or discount a given employer pays to a worker controlling for the
worker effect. The fixed effects are identified through worker moves across employers, in the
largest connected set.67
Our analysis reveals that the point estimates for worker effects are 7 log points smaller among
compliers compared to never-separators, although the difference is not statistically significant. The
results are consistentwithmarginalmatches having permanently lower earnings compared to their
peers, although the imprecision of the estimate prohibits a strong interpretation. Marginal jobs
and never-separators have indistinguishable establishment effects, with the point estimate for the
66This analysis is therefore restricted to those establishments we observe in the pre-REBP period.
67For estimation, we follow the procedure in Correia et al. (2016).
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difference being 2.7 log points (larger establishment effects among marginal jobs). The treatment
effect heterogeneity analysis also reveals no statistically significant differences in treatment effects
between matches with different establishment or worker effects. One interpretation is that the
excess REBP separations stem from matches with similar firm surplus, since establishment fixed
effects have been shown to correlate positively with measures of value added per worker (see Card
et al., 2018).
Tenure The point estimate for tenure of workers in marginal jobs is slightly higher compared
to the whole sample, although the difference is not statistically significant (same for treatment
effect heterogeneity). The complier mean for tenure in 1988 is 13.48 years compared to 11.61 years
for never-separators. Tenure is a particularly ambiguous attribute as it may be associated with
distinctly negative firm surplus but positive worker surplus (Lazear, 1979, 1981; Frimmel et al.,
2018), but alternatively positive joint surplus due to ex ante investments (Oi, 1962) or match quality
due to selectionmechanism (Cahuc et al., 2006; Hagedorn andManovskii, 2013; Bagger et al., 2014).
Sickness and Disability Measures of worker sickness and disability are interesting complier
attributes because they may capture disutility of labor or lower productivity. Since we analyze a
sample of workers employed at the onset of the reform, we cannot focus on sick leave or disability
spells at that time. Instead, we focus on sick leave and disability rates at the 4-digit industry level
in the pre-reform period. We exploit the ASSD administrative registration of these spells. For
both indicators, sick leave and disability, as well as for the combined rate of the two, we find that
compliers come from industries with higher indicators of morbidity among older workers. For
example, compliers’ industries have a 0.8 ppt higher share of workers on sick leave or disability
compared to never-separators, about 50% of a standard deviation.68 Similarly, these industries
exhibited stronger treatment effects. Overall, these results suggest that REBP dissolved matches
in which the disutility of working increases or worker productivity decreases with age, consistent
with low and shrinking (worker) surplus.69
Long-TermNonemployment Risk Finally, we consider an indicator for risk of long-term nonem-
ployment. We do so by regressing an indicator for experiencing a nonemployment spell longer
than one year on a set of predictors among the sample of workers in the pre-reform period from
1982 to 1987. The pre-separation variables we include for the prediction are fixed effects for 15
large industries, an indicator for being in a white-collar occupation, the local unemployment rate,
and third-degree polynomials of tenure in current job and experience over the last 25 years. We
then analyze the predicted risk of a long-term nonemployment spell as a complier attribute for our
sample of pre-REBP 1988 jobs.
Compared to the never-separators, compliers have a 7.4 ppt higher risk of experiencing an
nonemployment spell longer than one year based on our prediction. The difference is statistically
significant. The point estimates for treatment effect heterogeneity along this dimension point in a
similardirectionalthoughare lessprecisely estimated. Overall, the evidence suggests that theREBP
reform selected those workers who had a higher risk of experiencing long-term nonemployment
after a separation even in the absence of the reform. This perspective is consistent with our finding
68These proxies are powerful because for workers younger than 55, a disability spell indicates severe health problems
as disability insurance formally requires medical impairment to reduce the capacity to work by at least 50 percent in any
occupation. The highest incidence of sickness and disability can be found in mining, construction, and manufacturing,
sectors dominated by blue-collar labor, which also showed a high share of marginal jobs.
69A caveat to this interpretation arises from the potential positive selection implied by the fact that our sample
considers workers employed at that age in these industries at the onset of the reform.
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that most of the excess REBP separators went into long-term nonemployment as documented in
Section 3. Moreover, the workers that separated from their 1988 job in response to REBP evidently
were unlikely to find, or seek, reemployment, consistent with the workers having low surplus with
respect to nonemployment, as in our framework in Sections 5 and 6
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D Variable Construction
We describe the construction of each outcome variable presented in the paper. In the descriptions
below, status refers to a variable in theASSDaggregating hundreds of administrative designations
into 12 labormarket statuses (Zweimüller et al., 2009). We classify self-employment (status == 6)
and mini-jobs (status == 10) as employment.
1. Separation
• Create an indicator if equal to one, between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), the
worker is observed in the same establishment.
• If not, the worker is separated
2. Separation into Nonemployment
• Create an indicator equal to one if the worker separated as defined above and had no
other employer between 1988q2 and 1993q3.
3. Separation into New Job
• Create an indicator equal to one if the worker separated as defined above and had
another employer (establishment) in the interim.
4. Unemployment (Months)
• Between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), count the number of quarters where the
worker is observed on UI or UA (status  1).
• Multiply the quarter count by 3 to get a monthly count for tractability.
5. Continuous Employment (Months)
• Between two periods (e.g., 1988q2 and 1993q3), count the number of quarters where the
worker is employed in the same establishment as the quarter before.
• Stop counting when the worker is observed either employed in a new establishment or
with another labor market status.
6. Quit (Indicator)
• Out of the original labor market spell data from the ASSD, count the number of days
between the end of an employment spell (status  3) and the beginning of an unem-
ployment spell (status  1).
• For the yearly analysis, isolate employment spells that end during the REBP period
(1988q2 through 1993q3).
• For the age analysis, isolate employment spells that end while the worker is between 50
and 55 years old.
• If the beginning of the unemployment spell occurs 28 days or more after the end of any
employment spell during this range, the worker is considered to have quit.
7. Local Unemployment Rate
• Take the snapshot of men in the ASSD from 1988q2 (May 15, 1988).
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• Assign each worker a municipality (Gemeinde) by the location of the establishment at
which they work.
• Count the number on UI (status  1) in each municipality.
• Count the number of workers not on any pension, i.e. neither on disability (e.g.,
Berufsunfähigkeitspension) nor retirement pensions.
8. Local Unemp. Rate (50+)
• Do the same as for unemployment rates, but restrict to the sample of workers who are
50 years old or older in 1988q2.
9. Establishment Size
• For every establishment, count the total number of men of any age employed in 1988q2.
10. Employment Growth at Establishment
• In Table 1 and the complier analysis, this counts the percent difference between the
number ofmen (no age restriction) employed in the establishment in 1983q2 and 1988q2.
• In Figure 9, this is the percent difference between the number of men born in 1933 or
later (to avoid retirements) and employed in each establishment in 1994q1 and Q1 of
each following year.
11. 1(Growing Establishment)
• In all cases, this is an indicator for whether the establishment employment growth
variable calculated above is positive.
12. Employment Growth at Industry
• This counts the percent difference between the number of men (no age restriction)
employed in one of 15 industries in 1983q2 and 1988q2.
13. Establishment Earnings Fixed Effects (AKM)
• Begin with the sample of all workers in May 1977 through 1987.
• The earnings value is the total annual earnings in 2002 EUR from the establishment at
which the worker is employed on June 15 of each year.
• Winsorize the earnings value to the 5th and 95th percentile by year and take the loga-
rithm.
• Regress log earnings on a third-degree polynomial of age and fixed effects for each
worker andestablishmentusing theprocedure to estimatehigh-dimensional fixedeffects
outlined in Correia et al. (2016).
• Assign to each worker the establishment fixed effect from the establishment at which
they work in 1988q2.
14. Worker Earnings Fixed Effects (AKM)
• Use the worker fixed effects estimated in the proecedure outlined to estimate establish-
ment fixed effects.
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15. Share on Sick Leave/Disability in Industry
• Begin with the sample of men age 50 to 55 in any quarter of years 1977 through 1988.
• If workers are nonemployed in a given quarter, assign the establishment identifier of
their last employe, i.e. the establishment identifier of the last establishment where
status  3.
• These assigned establishments are used to assign industry.
• By four-digit NACE industry level, calculate the share of workers on sick leave (status
 2) and receiving disability payments (status  5) as a fraction of all workers assigned
to that industry across all periods.
16. Long Spell Duration Risk
• Begin with the sample of all employed men in 1982 and track them through 1987.
• Count the length of nonemployment spells.
• Isolate the maximum length of a nonempmloyment spell for each worker.
• Create an indicator for whether the maximum length of the nonemployment spell for
each worker is greater than 1 year (4 quarters).
• Regress this indicator on fixed effects for 15 large industries, an indicator for being in
a white-collar occupation, the local unemployment rate (see above), and third-degree
polynomials of tenure in current job and experience over the last 25 years.
• Predict the outcome, i.e. risk of long nonemployment duration, for every worker in the
REBP sample using these estimates.
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E Additional Tables
Table A.1: Complier Characteristics: Balance Check
Non-REBP Region REBP Region Difference
Blue Collar 0.0180 0.0270 0.00900
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Emp. Growth Industry -0.00500 -0.00700 -0.00200
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Emp. Growth at Establishment -0.0310 -0.0540 -0.0220
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
1(Growing Establishment) -0.0220 -0.0480 -0.0260
(0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Annual Earnings (1,000 EUR) 0.313 0.401 0.0880
(0.071) (0.130) (0.136)
Establishment Earnings Fixed Effect (AKM) 0.0140 0.0110 -0.00300
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Worker Earnings Fixed Effect (AKM) -0.0310 -0.0330 -0.00200
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Tenure 1.276 1.502 0.226
(0.078) (0.094) (0.107)
Share on Sick Leave in Industry × 100 -0.00200 0.00300 0.00500
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Share on Disability in Industry × 100 0.0540 0.124 0.0700
(0.022) (0.027) (0.035)
Share on Sick Leave/Disability in Industry × 100 0.0520 0.129 0.0770
(0.024) (0.029) (0.038)
Long Nonemployment Spell Duration Risk 0.0710 0.0760 0.00500
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Establishment Size: 5 or Less -0.00700 -0.00800 -0.00100
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Establishment Size: 6 and 20 -0.00700 -0.0120 -0.00500
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Establishment Size: 21 and 100 -0.00200 -0.00800 -0.00600
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Establishment Size: 101 and 200 0.00200 0.00300 0.00100
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Establishment Size: 201 or Greater 0.0140 0.0260 0.0120
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Note: This table reports the mean difference for the characteristics reported in the left column between REBP-eligible
and -ineligible cohorts in the non-REBP Region (column 1) vs. the REBP Region (column 2). Column (3) reports the
difference between column (2) and (1). For an overview of the methodology underlying the decomposition into the
groups and a detailed discussion of the results, see Appendix C, and Appendix D for details on how the variables are
constructed. For each of the variables and groups, the table reports means as well as standard errors (in parentheses)
based on 1,000 bootstrap replications blocked at the administrative region level. Given the small percentage-point
differences, the industry share variables are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Earnings are reported in thousands of 2018
Euros.
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Table A.2: Complier Characteristics and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Results
Complier Never-Sep Diff. (C-N) Always-Sep Diff. (C-A) SD Interaction w/
REBP Eligibility
Blue Collar 0.823 0.505 0.318 0.679 0.144 0.499 0.0630
(0.054) (0.053) (0.056) (0.040) (0.061) (0.022)
Emp. Growth Industry -0.00400 0.0440 -0.0480 0.0250 -0.0290 0.0670 -0.0990
(0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.038)
Emp. Growth at Establishment -0.172 0.102 -0.274 0.0100 -0.182 0.303 -0.0760
(0.079) (0.014) (0.073) (0.031) (0.083) (0.037)
1(Growing Establishment) 0.111 0.563 -0.452 0.373 -0.262 0.499 -0.0840
(0.117) (0.033) (0.103) (0.032) (0.117) (0.037)
Annual Earnings (1,000 EUR) 37.70 37.92 -0.216 35.41 2.294 9.869 0.0200
(1.640) (1.077) (1.464) (1.091) (1.773) (0.026)
Establishment Earnings Fixed Effect (AKM) 0.0380 0.0110 0.0270 0.0350 0.00300 0.224 -0.00400
(0.038) (0.011) (0.039) (0.011) (0.041) (0.027)
Worker Earnings Fixed Effect (AKM) 0.0710 0.141 -0.0700 0.0460 0.0250 0.271 -0.0120
(0.059) (0.021) (0.050) (0.020) (0.054) (0.021)
Tenure 13.48 11.61 1.868 10.77 2.710 5.845 0.0350
(1.700) (0.578) (1.876) (0.784) (2.150) (0.038)
Share on Sick Leave in Industry 0.00900 0.00800 0.00100 0.00800 0.00100 0.00200 0.0930
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071)
Share on Disability in Industry 0.0610 0.0540 0.00700 0.0650 -0.00400 0.0130 0.0730
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.038)
Share on Sick Leave/Disability in Industry 0.0700 0.0620 0.00800 0.0740 -0.00400 0.0140 0.0580
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.027)
Long Nonemployment Spell Duration Risk 0.434 0.360 0.0740 0.363 0.0700 0.127 0.0530
(0.030) (0.005) (0.029) (0.008) (0.034) (0.045)
Establishment Size: 5 or Less 0.0980 0.0900 0.00800 0.0550 0.0420 0.281 0.00200
(0.063) (0.014) (0.063) (0.008) (0.063) (0.030)
Establishment Size: 6 and 20 0.0190 0.0790 -0.0600 0.0570 -0.0380 0.295 -0.0540
(0.033) (0.008) (0.034) (0.008) (0.036) (0.032)
Establishment Size: 21 and 100 -0.0210 0.232 -0.253 0.425 -0.446 0.447 -0.110
(0.078) (0.018) (0.070) (0.036) (0.094) (0.042)
Establishment Size: 101 and 200 0.0450 0.0550 -0.0100 0.0640 -0.0190 0.237 -0.0140
(0.057) (0.007) (0.057) (0.022) (0.055) (0.042)
Establishment Size: 201 or Greater 0.859 0.544 0.315 0.398 0.461 0.500 0.102
(0.144) (0.036) (0.139) (0.037) (0.146) (0.051)
Note: This table reports characteristics of compliers, never-separators, always-separators as well as difference between the groups based on the methodology in Section C.
Compliers are those workers who are employed in 1988 and whose job would have survived in the absence of the REBP reform. For each of the variables and groups, the table
reports means as well as standard errors (in parentheses) based on 1,000 bootstrap replications blocked at the administrative region level. See Section C and Appendix D for
more details on how the variables are constructed. See Section C for the methodology underlying the decomposition into the groups. Earnings are reported in thousands of
2018 Euros.
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Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Initially Employed Workers (Age 50 to 55)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.124*** 0.098** 1.027** 0.745 -1.147***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.506) (0.560) (0.328)
REBP Region -0.035 0.022** 0.129 0.129 0.559
(0.031) (0.010) (0.302) (0.238) (0.527)
Treated Cohort -0.070*** -0.006** -0.381 -0.249 1.174**
(0.015) (0.002) (0.312) (0.181) (0.581)
Constant 0.424*** 0.130*** 2.299*** 1.117* 14.605***
(0.080) (0.021) (0.822) (0.603) (1.638)
Observations 378,693 378,693 378,693 378,693 378,693
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.005
No of Clusters 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The table reports results of the econometric specification in (1). REBP captures the effect of REBP-eligibility on the outcomes listed in columns (1) through
(5) on a sample of workers employed in the quarter before turning 50. Separation denotes an indicator function that is 1 if a worker is not employed by their
employer at age 49.75 by the quarter before they turn 55. Separation into Nonemployment denotes an indicator for Separation from the initial employer interacted
with an indicator for not taking up employment with another employer by the quarter before turning 55. Nonemployment (Quarters), Unemployment (Benefits)
(Quarters), and Continuous Employment (Quarters) denote the quarters of nonemployment, unemployment benefits, and continuous employment with the initial
employer between age 50 and age 55. Standard errors clustered at the administrative region level are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗
5%, and ∗∗∗ 1%.
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Table A.4: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Survivors (1994 Through 1995)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.008* 0.004 0.002 -0.022 -0.016
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010)
REBP Region -0.012 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.058**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.018) (0.013) (0.026)
Treated Cohort 0.072*** 0.083*** 0.198*** 0.048** -0.181***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.021) (0.018)
Constant 0.093*** 0.044** 0.113** 0.044 4.744***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.047) (0.036) (0.069)
Observations 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.020 0.017 0.003 0.009
No of Clusters 99 99 99 99 99
Note: See the note for Table 3 for details.
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Table A.5: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Survivors (1994 Through 1997)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.022** 0.019*** 0.076 -0.122 -0.120*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.055) (0.082) (0.069)
REBP Region -0.015 0.005 -0.005 0.010 0.172
(0.026) (0.013) (0.113) (0.083) (0.184)
Treated Cohort 0.200*** 0.240*** 1.555*** 0.227* -1.319***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.123) (0.119)
Constant 0.220*** 0.090** 0.638** 0.269 11.297***
(0.069) (0.036) (0.284) (0.209) (0.509)
Observations 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.079 0.062 0.006 0.029
No of Clusters 99 99 99 99 99
Note: See the note for Table 3 for details.
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Table A.6: Difference-in-Differences Effects of the REBP on Outcomes of Survivors (1994 Through 1998)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.026** 0.018* 0.145 -0.170 -0.224**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.096) (0.114) (0.110)
REBP Region -0.022 0.008 -0.001 0.015 0.262
(0.029) (0.014) (0.184) (0.133) (0.299)
Treated Cohort 0.241*** 0.299*** 2.651*** 0.282* -2.187***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.039) (0.169) (0.194)
Constant 0.293*** 0.122*** 1.053** 0.434 14.154***
(0.080) (0.038) (0.461) (0.334) (0.837)
Observations 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785 207,785
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.104 0.085 0.005 0.040
No of Clusters 99 99 99 99 99
Note: See the note for Table 3 for details.
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Table A.7: Robustness to Retirement Dynamics (Dropping Cohorts Born Before 1938): 1994 Through 1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Separation Separation Nonemployment Unemp. (Benefits) Cont. Empl.
Into Nonemployment (Quarters) (Quarters) (Quarters)
REBP Region × Treated Cohort 0.011* 0.012** 0.062*** -0.018 -0.089***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.025)
REBP Region -0.003 0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.116
(0.019) (0.011) (0.056) (0.041) (0.088)
Treated Cohort 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.288*** 0.065* -0.227***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.034) (0.037)
Constant 0.157*** 0.068** 0.324** 0.136 8.166***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.142) (0.107) (0.241)
Observations 178,590 178,590 178,590 178,590 178,590
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.002 0.003
No of Clusters 99 99 99 99 99
Note: The table reports results of the specification in 5while dropping all workers who reached retirement age by 1998. REBP captures the effect of REBP-eligibility
on the outcomes listed in columns (1) through (5) on a sample of workers employed at the same establishment in May 1988 and February 1994. The regression
specification includes region and cohort effects. Separation denotes an indicator function that is 1 if a worker is not employed by their employer from February
1994 (and May 1988) in February 1996. Separation into Nonemployment denotes an indicator for Separation from the initial employer interacted with an indicator
for not being employed in February 1996. Employment Indicator denotes whether a worker is employed in February 1996. Employment (Quarters) , Unemployment
(Quarters) and Continuous Employment (Quarters) denote the quarters of employment, unemployment insurance/assistance receipt, and continuous employment
with the initial employer between February 1994 and 1996. Standard errors clustered at the administrative region level are reported in parentheses. Levels of
significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗∗∗ 1%.
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F Additional Figures
Figure A.3: Benefit Extensions and Separations Among Younger Cohorts
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Note: Panel (a) shows the share of workers who separated from their 1988q2-employer (right before the reform) by
1993q3 (when reform had just ended) for all workers born between 1928 and 1958. It plots rates by month of birth and
within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid) regions. Panel (b) shows the difference between the
REBP and the control region by cohort.
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Figure A.4: Benefit Extensions and Employment Outcomes by Age
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Note: Panels (a) and (c) show the average number of quarters that the workers are employed and on UI, respectively,
until the quarter before they turn 55, among those employed in the quarter before they turn 50. Both plot rates by
month of birth and within the REBP (red, short dashes) and non-REBP (blue, solid) regions. Panels (b) and (d) show the
difference between the REBP and the control region by cohort. Cohorts born after 1943 were not covered by the policy
as they turned 50 after the program was abolished 1993.
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1933 1938 1943 1948
Year of Birth
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 1st Quintile (Lowest Growth)
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 2nd Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 3rd Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 4th Quintile
∆ Survivor Separations Q3-93 to Q1-94, T vs. C, 5th Quintile (Highest Growth)
Note: This figure gives a sense of possible post-abolition separation effects by REBP. It plots, by year of birth, the
separations from 1993q3, the first quarter after the abolition of the REBP, to 1994q1, among the workers who remain
employed in their 1988q2 establishment in 1993q3, i.e. the REBP “survivors.” It breaks the separations into quintiles
of industry growth rates (not worker-weighted) to emphasize where the additional separations occur. This, along
with grandfathering clauses in the law abolishing the REBP (see Section 2), motivates our decision to analyze possible
resilience effects by looking at jobs that survived through 1994q1, rather than those surviving only to the abolition of
the reform.
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Figure A.6: Establishment-Level “Hockey-Sticks”
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Employment Growth, 1994-1997 (2.5 ppt bins)
Treatment Group: REBP Cohort, REBP Region
Old Control Group: REBP Cohort, Non-REBP Region
Young Control Group: Non-REBP Cohort, REBP Region
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Treatment Group: REBP Cohort, REBP Region
Old Control Group: REBP Cohort, Non-REBP Region
Young Control Group: Non-REBP Cohort, REBP Region
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Note: These figures plot the results of an analysis focusing on labor demand shifts within non-steel sector establishments. In an attempt
to confirm the “hockey-stick” relationship between separations and employment growth at the establishment level (Davis et al., 2013) in
the Austrian setting, Panels (a), (b), and (c) plot annual separation rates for male workers employed in a given year by bins of annual
establishment employment growth rates (first quarter of every year), pooling years 1994 through 1995, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Panels
(d), (e), and (f) focus on separations among the four relevant groups tracked throughout the paper: REBP-eligible and -ineligible birth
cohorts and regions, while still plotting against total establishment employment growth. We ignore the cohorts born before 1935, 1937, and
1938 since they have reached retirement age in 1995, 1997, and 1998, respectively. Panels (g), (h), and (i) plot the slope of the cohort-specific
relationship between separations and establishment growth among shrinking establishments for each year of birth and split between
the REBP and non-REBP regions for each time horizon. We adjust throughout for spurious layoffs due to mergers, take-overs, and
administrative changes to the ASSD using the procedure outlined in Fink et al. (2010).
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